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EMOTIONAL HARM IN HOUSING
DISCRIMINATION CASES: A NEW LOOK AT A
LINGERING PROBLEM
Victor M. Goode*
and Conrad A. Johnson**
INTRODUCTION
With the United States Supreme Court's condemnation of legal
segregation in Brown v. Board of Education' in 1954, and a vigor-
ous civil rights movement that led to the passage of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act,' the nation entered the beginning of a new era in race
relations. This, and future civil rights legislation, would be charac-
terized by the development of a national agenda for ending dis-
crimination and promoting equality. One area that was not
included in this initial congressional effort, but later found its way
into the legislative agenda, was the subject of housing discrimina-
tion. Despite the relatively few debates and the near absence of
any extensive record from committees, Congress finally passed the
Civil Rights Act of 1968.4 This provision, enacted as 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3601-3619 and § 3631, and also known as the Fair Housing Act
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ern University; J.D., Rutgers Newark School of Law. I would like to thank the dedi-
cated staff of the Open Housing Center of New York with whom I have served as a
Board member for the last eight years and whose work to end housing discrimination
helped inspire this Article.
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bia University; J.D., Brooklyn Law School. I am grateful to the following people for
their assistance with various aspects of this project: Professors Mary Marsh Zulack,
Victor Goode, and Harriet S. Rabb. Additional thanks are owed to Esther Hoffman,
Rochelle Shoretz, John P. Relman, Charles Cronin, Shavonne Norris, and Dr. Hugh
F. Butts. This Article is dedicated to my children, for whom I hope that over time,
this serves only as a reminder of past practices, not current events.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Pub L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scatered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
3. The term "the Second American Revolution" was coined over half a century
ago to refer to this period of change. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877, at xxiii (1988). The struggle to pass the 1964
Civil Rights Act is certainly a continuation and extension of the civil rights concepts
enshrined in the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1868.
4. See Jean E. Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A Legislative History and a Perspective, 8
WASHBURN L.J. 149, 160 (1969) (noting that the combination of the assassination of
Martin Luther King and the release of the Kerner Commission Report following mas-
sive rioting in 1968, prompted Congress to pass a version of the Fair Housing Act that
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("FHA"), prohibits discrimination in the lease, sale, or rental of
housing on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or
national origin.5 Nevertheless, many recent commentators have
agreed that few areas of the law have failed to achieve their lofty
goals as dramatically and persistently as our nation's fair housing
statutes.6 The dream of ending discrimination in housing, which
many hoped would provide the vehicle for integrating neighbor-
hoods, schools, and eventually the nation's consciousness, has been
largely unrealized.7 Some have argued that this has been primarily
due to the deficiencies in the law itself.8 Others criticize the limited
enforcement it has received, 9 but most agree that persistent opposi-
tion to the integration of our housing market has left Title VIII as
an ironic component of the civil rights arsenal.' 0 The law certainly
stands as a bold and optimistic proclamation. As stated by Senator
Walter Mondale, one of its sponsors, the Act would replace the
nation's ghettos by "truly integrated and balanced living pat-
terns."11 While some civil right measures have been curtailed over
the years, Title VIII has been uniformly supported by the few Su-
preme Court decisions that have reviewed the constitutionality or
was almost identical to the bill introduced by Senator Mondale that had been previ-
ously rejected).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3619 (2003); id. § 3631.
6. See Margalynne Armstrong, Desegregation Through Private Litigation: Using
Equitable Remedies to Achieve the Purposes of the Fair Housing Act, 64 TEMP. L.
REv. 909, 913-15 (1991) (commenting on Congress's continued legislative efforts to
combat housing discrimination and the remaining deficiencies in the current state of
the law).
7. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 2-3 (1993) (stating that contin-
ued segregation in urban America has been largely overlooked for the past twenty
years).
8. Armstrong, supra note 6, at 910-12 (arguing that although the 1988 amend-
ments did remove the limitations on damages and added the option of seeking an
administrative remedy, systemic housing segregation could only seriously be ad-
dressed by an equally large scale enforcement effort on the part of the government).
9. Guido Calabresi, Preface to THE FAIR HOUSING ACT AFTER TWENTY YEARS:
A CONFERENCE AT YALE LAW SCHOOL 7, 7-8 (Robert G. Schwemm ed., 1989).
10. The 2002 Fannie Mae National Housing Survey found that only thirteen per-
cent of whites and twenty percent of African-Americans cite a neighborhood's ethnic
makeup as key to their choice of where to purchase a home. THE GROWING DEMAND
FOR HOUSING: 2002 FANNIE MAE NATIONAL HOUSING SURVEY 5 (2002), available at
http://www.fanniemae.com/global/pdf/media/survey2002.pdf (last visited Mar. 15,
2003). Nearly half (forty-seven percent) of the African-American respondents, how-
ever, said that they are treated less fairly than other groups in the home-buying pro-
cess. Id. at 11. These statistics illustrate the disparity between a growing acceptance
of multiracial communities on the one hand, and African-Americans' experiences of
housing discrimination on the other.
11. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972).
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the application of the statute.' 2 Since its adoption over thirty years
ago, lower courts have mainly adopted an interpretation of the Fair
Housing Act that reflects an effort to fulfill its broad legislative
purpose.13 Many state agencies have also adopted the principle
prohibitions of Title VIII,'4 and with its 1988 amendments, the law
has been strengthened, broadened, and attorney's fee provisions
have permitted the private bar to play a primary role in its enforce-
ment.'5 Nevertheless, housing discrimination remains persistent
and Title VIII is a mere stopgap measure for a social issue that
seems intractable.1 6
Despite repeated judicial sanctioning of the most egregious
forms of housing discrimination, there are areas of fair housing law
and litigation that warrant a closer examination because they re-
veal the legacy of racial discrimination that continues to infect the
process of change in this field. This Article will examine one aspect
of compensation remedies in fair housing cases. While the general
scope of potential damages under Title VIII has been well estab-
lished for many years, 17 one area of potential relief that remains
fraught with uncertainty is adequate compensation for emotional
12. While the Supreme Court has never ruled on the constitutionality of Title
VIII, several lower courts have addressed the issue. United States v. Parma, 661 F.2d
562, 571-73 (6th Cir. 1981); United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115,
120 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 826 (1973). "All of these court decisions
have been rendered by lower federal courts. ... The Supreme Court, in almost 20
years since Title VIII was enacted, has not decided a single substantive case under the
Fair Housing Act." BUREAU NAT'L AFFAIRS, THE NEW FAIR HOUSING LAW: IMPACT
AND ANALYSIS 20 (1988).
13. One of the early cases that addressed the breadth and scope of Title VIII was
Trafficante. In that case, the Court said that Congress intended the FHA to be con-
strued broadly to carry out its mandate to achieve fair housing opportunities, and that
the interpretations by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment ("HUD") be given considerable weight. Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 211.
14. For a full list of state laws prohibiting housing discrimination, see 1A ASPEN
LAW & Bus., FAIR HOUSING- FAIR LENDER (2001).
15. Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 211 (describing private lawyers as "private attorneys
general," for the purposes of enforcement); see Keith Aoki, Recent Developments,
Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 249, 262 (1989)
(listing the extension of coverage to the handicapped and families, strengthening the
administrative review process, increasing penalties, and permitting attorney fees for
successful plaintiffs).
16. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 7, at 187.
17. An early case is Steele v. Title Realty Co., in which a prospective tenant sued a
real estate broker under the FHA. 478 F.2d 380, 382 (10th Cir. 1973). The Tenth
Circuit stated that, "[d]amages in cases of this kind are not limited to out-of-pocket
losses but may include an award for emotional distress and humiliation." Id. at 384.
Later, after the 1988 amendments to Title VIII, a California district court held that
"[t]he FHA ... entitles the original plaintiff in a private action for violation of the
provisions of the Act to seek an award of 'actual and punitive damages.' This includes
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distress.18 While the general trend of cases, in both administrative
agencies and courts, indicates that significant progress has been
made in the recognition and understanding of emotional harm, fail-
ures to adequately address this issue continue.19 Although admin-
istrative judges appear more receptive to evidence of emotional
harm and are more likely to award significant damages now than in
the past,2" the federal bench has not demonstrated a similar consis-
damages for emotional distress, humiliation, and mental anguish." Ambruster v. Mon-
ument 3: Realty Fund VIII Ltd., 963 F. Supp. 862, 865 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
18. See ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION
25-17 to 25-21 (2002).
Establishing the size of a Title VIII damage award has turned out to be a
most uncertain process. Awards of actual damages in private fair housing
cases have ranged from as little as $1 to as high of $1 million and more. The
case law provides little in the way of explanation for these variations or of
guidance or standards for evaluating future fair housing claims.
Id. at 25-17 to 25-20.
19. See Robert G. Schwemm, The Future of Fair Housing Litigation, 26 J. MAR-
SHALL L. REV. 745, 758-60 (1993). Professor Schwemm notes that:
[t]he upper level of damage awards in fair housing cases has increased dra-
matically in recent years. Four cases in a thirteen-month period from 1991 to
1993 illustrate this phenomenon. First, in December 1991, a Los Angeles
case involving rental discrimination against blacks and Hispanics was settled
for $1,100,000, the first time a Title VIII case had exceeded the one million
dollar figure. In May of 1992, a jury in Washington, D.C., awarded $850,000
to a black homeseeker and two fair housing groups against a condominium
complex that had used only white models in its advertisements. A few
months later, another Washington jury awarded $2,000,000 in punitive dam-
ages and $415,000 in compensatory damages to an individual and two fair
housing groups in a rental case involving familial status discrimination....
The results in these cases reflect a general trend toward much higher awards
that make the size of earlier fair housing verdicts seem paltry by comparison.
Id. at 759. But see Portee v. Hastava, 853 F. Supp. 597, 607-09 (1994) (reversing a
jury's damages award, saying that it was shocking to the judicial conscience, despite
testimony concerning the impact of the discrimination on an interracial couple's rela-
tionship, the wife's performance on her job, the husband's attempt to lessen the
trauma through drinking, and the impact on a minor child who was subjected to one
of his first experiences with racism. Also, in Johnson v. Hale, the district court refused
to order any compensation for emotional harm. 13 F.3d 1351, 1352 (9th Cir. 1994).
On remand, the judge ordered $125 for each victim. Id. at 1353. In United States v.
Lepore, a victim was only awarded $500 for emotional distress. 816 F. Supp. 1011,
1025 (M.D. Pa. 1991). These amounts represent a near total disbelief that discrimina-
tion produced emotional harm and it is precisely this uneven, potentially biased, and
idiosyncratic approach that is addressed in this Article.
20. Schwemm, supra note 19, at 757 n.89 ("All of the large HUD ALJ awards for
intangible injuries" have been made in race cases). This may reflect the fact that
unlike state or federal court judges, the HUD administrative judges are specialists in
discrimination matters and may have become more sensitive to these issues as a
result.
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tency toward accepting claims of emotional harm.2 1 Despite the
progress in judicial recognition of the emotional harm caused by
racism, there is still a disturbing trend that diminishes the value
ascribed to the harm suffered by victims of housing discrimination
and limits proper compensation.22
There are many variables that affect the awarding of emotional
harm damages. 23 Achieving full compensation for emotional harm
resulting from discrimination presents special practical problems
and raises theoretical issues that deserve greater attention. This is
particularly true in light of the new perspectives on racial discrimi-
nation emanating from the critical race and feminist legal move-
ments.24 Insights from these theoretical perspectives and social
science studies suggest that when confronted with the full panoply
of remedies designed to fully compensate the victim of housing dis-
crimination, some juries and judges are unable to comprehend the
depth of harm from discrimination and do not see an African-
American plaintiff through an empathetic, unbiased lens.25 Com-
pensating a victim of racial discrimination requires a level of empa-
21. Deborah Dubroff, Sexual Harassment, Fair Housing and Remedies: Expanding
Statutory Remedies Into a Common Law Framework, 19 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 215,
228 (1997).
22. The current focus on the emotional harm component of a housing discrimina-
tion case owes much to the early work of Professor Robert G. Schwemm. In 1981,
Professor Schwemm pointed out that courts and administrative agencies were reluc-
tant to recognize the depth of emotional harm caused by discrimination. Robert G.
Schwemm, Compensatory Damages in Federal Fair Housing Cases, 16 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 83, 104 (1981). He argues that the legal theories that underlie compen-
sation for emotional harm were common in housing discrimination cases, but pointed
out several reasons for the very low awards that he tracked in both administrative
agencies and courts. Id. at 93-94. These include the lack of any definitive guidelines,
the presumption that the victim will react to discrimination like a "reasonable person"
(the traditional tort standard), the possibility of jury bias, and the receptivity of the
judge. Id. at 101, 108-09, 115.
23. Id. at 86.
24. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Foreword to The Jurisprudence Of Reconstruction,.
82 CAL. L. REV. 741, 743 (1994) (describing the Critical Race movement, she states,
"CRT inherits from traditional civil rights scholarship a commitment to a vision of
liberation from racism through right reason. Despite the difficulty of separating legal
reasoning and institutions from their racist roots, CRT's ultimate vision is redemptive,
not deconstructive."). The Authors attempt to apply "right reason" in Part III of this
Article where recommendations are made for addressing the issue of emotional harm
in housing discrimination cases.
25. See 1 HUGH F. Bu-Frs, THE BLACKNESS OF DARKNESS 99 (1993).
A frequently expressed sentiment is the view that white Americans lack em-
pathy for Blacks and as a result can not [sic] identify with racism and oppres-
sion, and take steps to extirpate them. Without accepting or rejecting that
view, one wonders at the difficulty in developing empathy toward any group
that is regarded as lowly or inhuman. Thus, the development of empathy
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thy and understanding that consists of more than a careful
weighing of the evidence.26 While this Article does not assert that
bias by the fact-finder is the single cause of low damage awards,
there is concern about the unevenness and general devaluation of
many emotional harm awards, their causes, and consequences.27
Emotional harm claims in housing discrimination cases tend to sub-
tly reflect the shadow of racism in this country.28 It is the persis-
tence of segregated housing patterns that contributes to a lack of
understanding of the impact of racism and a diminished sense of
empathy that is so essential in compensating the full nature of the
dignitary harm that flows from housing discrimination.29
While the pioneering work in critical race theory is one of the
lenses through which the present theories of compensation are ex-
amined, particularly as it applies to African-American victims of
housing discrimination, this Article also draws on other resources.
The Authors have utilized the insights of personal experience in
the fair housing clinic as a means of developing a practical strategy
to address this problem.3" This approach has led to a review of
relevant social science data that offers some explanations and per-
spectives on the effects of discrimination on its victims. 31 More im-
portantly, this Article attempts to address the issue with
appears to be secondary to an understanding of the barriers, resistances,
myths, and unconscious conflicts that inhibit that development.
Id. Dr. Butts has testified as an expert witness in a number of Title VII and fair
housing cases and has lectured on this subject at the Columbia Law School Fair Hous-
ing Clinic.
26. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 198 (1974) (recognizing that jury bias may
deprive a victim of discrimination the full consideration she deserves).
27. Schwemm, supra note 22, at 121-22.
28. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 7, at 97.
29. See, e.g., Diane Maluso, Shaking Hands With a Clenched Fist: The Effects of
Interpersonal Racism, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERPERSONAL DISCRIMINATION 50
(Bernice Lott & Diane Maluso eds., 1995). Maluso outlines findings from sociological
studies that have shown that reducing biases and stereotypes occurs most effectively
in social interactions where there is interracial contact between persons of equal sta-
tus, "in the pursuit of common goals." Id. at 58. This contact must be sustained and is
enhanced by strong institutional support or authority figures. Id. at 74. In other
words, the interpersonal activity that would normally occur in an integrated commu-
nity can be a major factor in achieving the conditions for a lessening of bias. But
conversely, the absence of integrated social experiences makes it more difficult to
overcome social biases.
30. Conrad Johnson has been teaching a fair housing clinic at Columbia Law
School for the past eleven years. Victor Goode worked with him and Professor Mary
Zulack as a visiting clinical professor from 1994 through 1996 and served on the
Board of the Open Housing Center. Their many discussions on this issue motivated
the development of this Article.
31. See infra Part II.
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recommendations for presenting emotional harm issues so that
both plaintiffs' attorneys and members of the judiciary can develop
a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of the effects of
emotional harm on victims of discrimination.32 In examining these
issues, there will be a review of the use of medical and psychother-
apeutic treatment and the use of expert witnesses. It will also sug-
gest an approach for educating fact finders about the nature of the
emotional harm that flows from a racist event.
There are no empirical studies that adequately explain how and
why decision-makers value emotional harm in housing discrimina-
tion cases in a manner that differs so greatly from the victim's ex-
perience and the scientific evidence of the effects of trauma
resulting from discrimination.33 This Article argues that biased
perceptions, a lack of information about the depth of emotional
trauma, or racial insensitivity may affect this process and it will
change only with a renewed effort and a different approach to
these cases from the civil rights bar.34 It is also an attempt to pro-
vide information that may assist in the proper evaluation of emo-
tional injury with data from social science sources that have not
32. Professor Schwemm's pioneering work in this field has laid the foundation for
future inquiries, including this Article. He points out that amassing the evidence of
emotional harm may be difficult. SCHWEMM, supra note 18, at 25-31 to 25-33. We
also believe that attorneys who take on housing discrimination cases do so out of a
personal and professional commitment to end this extremely destructive aspect of
discrimination in our society. This Article attempts to expand on this base by taking a
look at data drawn from inter-disciplinary sources, particularly the fields of psychol-
ogy, psychiatry, and sociology. While many of the problems in the development of
the emotional harm aspects of a discrimination case remain as Professor Schwemm
described them in 1982, studies in the social sciences have added considerable depth
and theoretical insight to those issues. Armed with this additional information, prac-
titioners may be even better prepared to plan the strategy of their case. For a fuller
discussion of these practical issues, see infra Part III.
33. In stark contrast to the almost cavalier perspective offered by some judges, see
Hope Landrine & Elizabeth A. Klonoff, The Schedule of Racist Events: A Measure of
Racial Discrimination and a Study of Its Negative Physical and Mental Health Conse-
quences, 22 J. BLACK PSYCHOL. 144, 145-47 (1996).
[R]acist events (unlike losing one's car keys or getting stuck in a traffic jam)
are inherently demeaning, degrading, and highly personal; they are attacks
upon and negative responses to something essential about the self that can-
not be changed: being an African American. Racist discrimination thereby
has a higher potential to erode the physical and mental health of African
Americans.
Id. at 147. "[T]he single most common problem presented by African Americans who
seek psychotherapy is anger about racism in their lives." Id. at 160.
34. Schwemm, supra note 22, at 107 n.124 (referring to the Court's opinion in
Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974), when acknowledging that low awards for emo-
tional harm may be due to jury prejudice).
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previously been marshaled primarily for this purpose. Evidence
of emotional harm must be presented in a manner that reveals the
full scope of its effects. The under-valuation by decision-makers is
not for the most part an open hostility to the reality of racial harm
as much as it is a lack of understanding and a reflection of the
cognitive distortion of race and racial issues that is a social phe-
nomena as well as a legal one.36 This Article will explore these
dynamics from the perspective of relevant social science data and
examine how they affect the analysis and understanding of evi-
dence of emotional harm.37 Part I provides an overview of the cur-
rent state of emotional harm cases. Part II discusses the issue of
bias in the process of reviewing discrimination cases from the per-
spective of critical race theory and recent social science data. In
Part III, this Article examines the cycles of ignorance that have
contributed to an under-valuation of emotional harm in housing
discrimination litigation. Finally, suggestions are made about how
to gather relevant psychological and medical information on the
effects of discrimination and how to incorporate that information
into a case so that the full extent of emotional harm is more prop-
erly understood and the victim of discrimination is made whole.
I. EMOTIONAL HARM OVERVIEW
Title VIII of the 1968 Civil Rights Act has been the primary legal
instrument at the federal level for attacking housing discrimination
for the last thirty years.38 The Act has had mixed results, but has
35. While the use of expert witnesses, particularly psychologists or therapists, has
been previously recommended, this Article attempts to expand upon those more gen-
eral recommendations. In particular, the issues of exploring bias from fact-finders are
examined, contextualized, and an individualized picture of the harm suffered by peo-
ple of color is presented. For a very valuable early treatment on emotional harm
issues, see Larry Heinrich, The Mental Anguish and Humiliation Suffered by Victims
of Housing Discrimination, 26 J. MARSHALL L. Ri-v. 39, 39 (1992).
36. See generally GORION ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1st ed. 1954).
This is one of the definitive works on racism and bias. He queries whether "discrimi-
nation and prejudice [are] facts of the social structure or of the personality structure."
1d. at 514. The answer, according to this Article, is both. Allport describes racism as
a social problem that has historical roots. Id. at 208-11. He describes how prejudice is
learned behavior by all groups and its belief structure is acquired from the social
order as the individual personality develops. Id. at 17-19, 297-310.
37. The premise of this Article is not that every judge and jury is biased against
minority plaintiffs. It is more likely that judges and juries in many cases may be no
better prepared than the general population in understanding the effects of discrimi-
nation and in their ability to give full value to those effects when the evidence is
presented.
38. See Roi3EIR- G. SCHWEMM, HOUSINc, DISCRIMINATION LAW 15 (1983). In
1968, the Supreme Court, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., gave new life to the Recon-
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generally received judicial support, and over its brief life there has
been very little dilution in its scope and application.39 Unlike the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which have gone through an
evolution of expansion followed by a more restrictive interpreta-
tion by the Courts,4 ° the FHA and its post-Reconstruction prede-
cessor, 42 U.S.C. § 1982, have both received supportive judicial
interpretations and have changed very little.4" Yet, despite this
generally favorable judicial treatment, housing discrimination re-
mains a persistent social problem, which seems to elude any solu-
tion through litigation.42  Persistent patterns of residential
segregation are a constant reminder of the lack of progress that this
country has made toward the integration of living space.43 This Ar-
struction era statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1982, which guarantees all persons the right to sell,
lease, and convey property. 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968). The Court held that § 1982 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 barred racial discrimination in the sale, rental, and lease
of housing. Id. at 413. While the language of the FHA and § 1982 differ, both have as
their underlying principal Congress's authority to bar discrimination in housing. Id.
39. The courts have generally supported the scope of coverage of the FHA, al-
though some procedural aspects of the FHA have been limited by the Supreme
Court. See, e.g., Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 98 (1979)
(dealing with standing); Curtis, 415 U.S. at 195 (dealing with the right to a trial by
jury); Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 205 (1972) (dealing with stand-
ing). In Trafficante, the Court reiterated its decision to follow Congress's intent to
construe the act broadly. 409 U.S. at 209-10.
40. An example of this trend is the requirement for a finding of discriminatory
intent articulated by the Court in Washington v. Davis. 426 U.S. 229, 238-39 (1976).
This interpretation is generally seen as a limiting factor on the use of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause in proscribing racial discrimination. See Derrick A. Bell, Foreword:
Equal Employment Law and the Continuing Need for Self-Help, 8 Loy. U. Ci. L.J.
681, 683 (1997). Similarly, the school desegregation cases saw the Fourteenth Amend-
ment scaled back as a tool for creating integrated public schools. In Milliken v. Brad-
ley, inter-district desegregation remedies were restricted. 418 U.S. 717, 741 (1974).
The decision in Freeman v. Pitts raised the de facto-de jure distinction to a doctrinal
level that all but trumped the principle of integration as a continuing legacy of Brown.
503 U.S. 467, 469 (1992). Ironically, one of the reasons for the "re-segregation" of the
schools in Dekalb County Georgia, described in Pitts, was "white flight" from the
district. Id. at 506. This gradual change in housing patterns along racial lines altered
the Court's ability to make student assignments in a manner that could remedy the
effects of the previously legally segregated schools.
41. See SCHWEMM, supra note 38, at 227-98 (discussing the procedures for enforce-
ment and cases supporting Title VIII).
42. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 7, at 60-82.
43. Id. This point has been brought out in dramatic fashion by Massey and
Denton. They cite considerable evidence that housing discrimination remains one of
the most persistent and damaging legacies of America's history of racial subordina-
tion. Id. Their data shows that despite our efforts to enforce fair housing laws at the
state and federal level, society has made very little progress toward the desegregation
of our living space. Id. at 64. They also say that the main factor is the continued sense
in a considerable portion of white society that while civil rights may be desirable in
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ticle argues that one corollary to the persistence of housing dis-
crimination is the devaluation of the experience of its victims.
While there is little evidence that this phenomenon is motivated by
ill will or open hostility by fact-finders, their reluctance to compre-
hend and value the full extent of the psychological damage of ra-
cism and the true toll that it imposes on its victims continues to be
reflected in low awards for many FHA claimants.44 Racial bias
does not suffice as the sole explanation for low and frequently une-
ven compensatory damages in all cases. For the most part, fact
finders and jurors, the majority of whom are white, view racial is-
sues no differently than the general population.45 But there are
misperceptions about race that remain prominent in American cul-
ture, which can affect numerous areas of decision-making, includ-
ing the courts, unless a conscious and consistent effort is made to
identify and remove them.46
Since 1974, with the decision of the Supreme Court in Curtis v.
Loether,47 courts have had broad equitable powers as they apply
the FHA to violations and lower courts have been awarding dam-
ages for the emotional harm suffered by victims of racial discrimi-
nation.48 The typical framework for relief in these cases is for the
plaintiff to seek an injunctive remedy, compensatory damages, pu-
theory, the "not in my backyard" phenomenon is especially strong when it comes to
sharing neighborhood living space and the subsequent potential for social interaction.
Id. at 79-82. Finally, their findings show that while this phenomenon affects white
acceptance of Asians and Latinos to varying degrees, its most persistent and stubborn
resistance is applied to the African-American. Id. at 67, 77. See Kathleen C. Engel,
Moving Up the Residential Hierarchy: A New Remedy for an Old Injury Arising From
Housing Discrimination, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1153, 1154-55 (1999).
A 1979 study funded by the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment ("HUD") estimated that there were two million incidents of housing
discrimination on the basis of race each year. More recent evidence reveals
that high rates of discrimination continue. In 1989, a HUD-sponsored fair
housing study of the number of listings shown to prospective buyers and
renters found that in over forty percent of the audits, blacks were shown
fewer listings than whites. Similarly, agents showed Hispanic renters fewer
units than whites in thirty-five percent of the audits, and showed Hispanic
buyers fewer units in over forty percent of the audits. Other audits have
uncovered even higher rates of housing discrimination, including one study
that found a ninety-percent discrimination rate.
Id. at 1155.
44. See supra notes 19-22.
45. See infra Part II.
46. See Maluso, supra note 29, at 72-75 (noting various misperceptions about race
in society and some methods of changing those perceptions).
47. 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
48. SCHWEMM, supra note 38, at 254.
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nitive damages, or some combination of all three.49 The principle
that underlies this remedy is that an aggrieved party should be
"made whole," through the remedial process.5 The courts have
generally adopted this "make whole" theory in housing discrimina-
tion cases.5'
In Curtis, the Supreme Court stated that emotional harm in a
housing discrimination case was similar to defamation or inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress in tort law. 52 Emotional harm
can be recognized in any claim for damages as long as sufficient
evidence establishing a causal link to the discriminatory act is
proven.53 The importance of this holding cannot be understated
because Title VIII, § 3613(c)(1), had no specific language to guide
courts on awarding damages. 4 The Curtis Court was unperturbed
by this omission and found an adequate rationale in tort remedies
bolstered by the general equitable powers vested in the federal
courts to hold that the legislation authorized equitable relief, in-
cluding damages similar to the tort of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress.5 5 While some states had previously enacted anti-
discrimination laws authorizing courts and administrative agencies
to offer similar relief,56 Curtis firmly established this principle in
49. Id. See, e.g., Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., 491 F.2d 634, 635 (7th Cir. 1974).
While the Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, 42 U.S.C. 1982 to 1988 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), does not contain specific language
authorizing the award of damages or equitable relief, the modern interpretation of the
statute has held that the full range of equitable remedies is available to a federal court
in fashioning a remedy for any violation of the statute. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 392 U.S. 409, 409 (1968). While Title VIII, only specifically authorizes the award
of actual damages, it has been interpreted to provide for damages for emotional harm.
Slatin v. Stanford Research Inst., 590 F.2d 1292, 1294 (4th Cir. 1979).
50. Schwemm, supra note 22, at 91. The concept of remedies in discrimination
cases broadly encompasses the right of a successful plaintiff to have access to the
variety of equitable relief that will provide real compensation for the injury that the
plaintiff suffered, including emotional harm. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 829
(2000). While the typical case does not usually involve considerable direct costs, the
emotional harm compensation as well as potential punitive damages can add to the
overall costs. Id. at 1053-54.
51. Slatin, 590 F.2d at 1294.
52. 415 U.S. at 195.
53. Id. at 196.
54. Id. at 197.
55. Id. at 196.
56. For a summary of state and federal cases and other resources dealing with the
emotional harm component of housing discrimination, see 1 KENTUCKY COMM'N ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, STAFF REPORT 82-1, DAMAGES FOR EMBARRASSMENT AND HUMILI-
ATION IN DISCRIMINATION CASES-THE RIGHT TO COMPENSATION FOR PSYCHIC IN-
JURY RESULTING FROM HOUSING DISCRIMINATION 69-79 (1982).
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the federal enforcement arsenal of the FHA.57 While none of
these early cases relied specifically on the dicta from Brown, the
acceptance by later federal courts that emotional harm flowed
from discrimination was certainly strengthened by the Supreme
Court's acknowledgment of dignitary harm for a victim of racial
discrimination. 58  This theory of discrimination and emotional
harm alluded to in Brown,59 also echoed studies of the harm caused
57. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 198 (affirming that Title VIII violations could result in dam-
ages for emotional harm and that the defendant was entitled to a jury trial).
58. It is worth noting that Justice Marshall, one of the architects of the Brown
litigation, wrote the Curtis opinion.
59. The trial court in Briggs v. Elliot, one of the four cases consolidated into the
Brown decision heard testimony from Dr. Kenneth Clark, a social psychologist who
testified as an expert witness. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL-
ITY 353 (1976). Dr. Clark used a doll preference study to demonstrate that legally
imposed segregation had a detrimental psychological impact on the African-Ameri-
can students in the segregated Claridon County schools. Id. at 353-54.
One of the controversial points of Dr. Clark's study was its focus on the self-depre-
cation or self-hatred aspects that were triggered by racial discrimination. Id. at 353.
The premise of his theory was that the victim internalizes the accusations and charac-
terizations of inferiority from the perpetrator or dominant class and begins to accept
them as true. Id. In the doll study, this phenomenon manifested as a preference by
the young black girls for white dolls and an explicit rejection of racial characteristics
associated with their own race depicted in the brown doll. Id. at 330-31, 354. This
overt rejection of aspects of one's self was presented to the Court as evidence of
emotional damage that resulted from imposed segregation. Id. at 353-54.
There were, however, problems with the Clark study from both a legal and scien-
tific perspective. Dr. Clark conceded at the time of the trial that it wasn't possible to
isolate the effects of school segregation from other influences of racial injustice and
thereby satisfy the standard of direct legal causation. Id. at 379. Later social scientists
have refuted the validity of Dr. Clark's study because of the small size of his sampling
and the somewhat ambiguous terminology that Clark used in questioning the children
about their identification with either the black or white doll. See Ernest Van Den
Haag, Social Science Testimony in the Desegregation Cases-A Reply to Professor
Kenneth Clark, 6 VILL. L. REV. 69, 74-76 (1960). But despite these weaknesses, Dr.
Clark had fashioned his study and findings on evidence from other more comprehen-
sive surveys and relied on the general belief among social scientists at that time that
segregation caused emotional harm to its victims. KLUGER, supra, at 318-19. Other
studies have verified his basic contention that, in addition to whatever material depri-
vation might characterize the conditions of the segregated school, legally imposed
segregation did cause psychological damage. Id. at 319.
While the doll study was legally problematic for establishing a clear chain of causal-
ity, pioneering work by the famed psychiatrist Dr. Frantz Fanon was also exploring
similar issues of emotional damage flowing from the skewed social relationship of one
race holding social, political, and economic dominance over another in his path break-
ing work Black Skin, White Mask. FRANTZ FANON, BLACK SKIN, WHITE MASK 141
(1967). In her analysis of the complete body of Fanon's work, Irene L. Gendzier,
states that:
Fanon discovered that the alienated Martiniquean existed only where there
was a dominant society that had reduced him to an inferior status. What
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by discrimination that were being conducted during that same pe-
riod in the social science community.6 ° These studies explored the
idea that racial discrimination was a particularly pernicious form of
personal degradation, and one whose psychological impact is often
subtle and only fully exposed with the assistance of social science
experts.61
Courts have traditionally employed two overlapping approaches
to claims of emotional harm in fair housing cases: traditional tort
theory62 and constitutional torts.63 In traditional tort theory, the
infliction of emotional harm was initially disfavored, but was later
concerned Fanon with respect to the Martiniquean, was the gradual process
of alienation from his culture and tradition, and the fact that this was accom-
panied by self-hatred or at the least, a profoundly disturbed ambivalence.
The rejection of the self came as a result of identification with the Other and
as a result of the acceptance of the Other's image of one's "inferior" caste.
IRENE L. GENDZIER, FRANTZ FANON: A CRITICAL STUDY 50 (1973). While Fanon's
work was preoccupied with a social psychoanalytic dimension of colonialism and was,
therefore, unencumbered by legal standards of causality, it is clear that the psycholog-
ical damage that he and Dr. Clark examined stemmed from the same source-racism.
Id. at 46-47. The attendant social structures needed to enforce these beliefs, such as
school segregation in the United States, or colonialism in the case of Martinique and
the other non-white French colonies, while considerably different in form, were essen-
tially the same. Id. at 6-8. In fact, Fanon's emphasis on the gradual process of this
phenomenon might account for the varied results that Dr. Clark received when he
performed the doll test in northern integrated schools and southern segregated
schools.
In United States v. Security Management Co., an apartment manager was sued under
the Fair Housing Act. 96 F.3d 260, 260 (7th Cir. 1996). In the course of determining
the liability of the two insurers, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit found that although the complaint did not expressly allege emotional harm,
that "racial discrimination, when encountered, is such an affront to one's intelligence
and individuality that we may assume, for our purposes, the presence of an allegation
of psychological injury." Id. at 268. A more recent case cites Security Management
for the proposition that "one can reasonably assume that a person who is the object
unlawful discrimination will suffer emotional harm." United States v. Wapinski Real
Estate, 2000 WL 28271, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 2000).
60. See, e.g., ALLPORT, supra note 36. The Nature of Prejudice, published in 1954,
the year of the Brown decision, represented a compilation of studies and theories that
Professor Allport began developing during the war years. It is a wide-ranging work
that has influenced many future works on the subject. For a retrospective on the
importance of The Nature of Prejudice, see Roy J. deCarvalho, Gordon W. Allport on
the Nature of Prejudice, 72 PSYCHOL. REP. 299, 301-05 (1993).
61. See, e.g., Jane Goodman-Delahunty & William E. Foote, Compensation for
Pain, Suffering and Other Psychological Injuries: The Impact of Daubert on Employ-
ment Discrimination Claims, 13 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 183, 187-89 (1995).
62. DOBBS, supra note 50, at 821. The most common emotional harm torts are
those based on intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 822. In the Restate-
ment Second, the three elements of this tort are: 1) severe emotional distress; 2)
caused by intentional or reckless conduct; and 3) that is extreme and outrageous. Id.
at 826. This tort is generally recognized and applies these basic requirements for re-
covery. Id.
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recognized as a legitimate claim for which damages might be
awarded. 64 The intentional infliction of emotional distress and neg-
ligent infliction of emotional distress are its two variants. Despite
this history with emotional harm issues, courts have generally
taken a conservative approach toward the infliction of emotional
distress claims, and this general caution carried over into the field
of housing discrimination.6 6 There are many understandable rea-
sons for this caution. Some include the general difficulty in placing
a monetary value on emotional harm, the difficulty in determining
the actual degree of harm, especially when the same degree of of-
fense may affect people very differently, the potential for exagger-
ation, the lack of objective measures, and low award precedent.67
Courts have also commented on the difficulty in making emotional
harm fit traditional tort economic theories, and the fear that emo-
tional harm will be a corollary claim to virtually every offense, no
matter how trivial.6 8 While these concerns are understandable,
courts addressing civil rights claims have never been required to
rigidly adhere to a traditional tort framework. 69 In addition, adher-
ing too closely to this caution can mask any subtle biases that might
affect the fact-finding process, and an overly cautious approach
would stand in contrast to the recognition in the social sciences that
some degree of emotional harm will result from any act of discrimi-
nation. 70 Any difficulties in measuring its magnitude and impact in
the legal context are separate and distinct from reservations about
its basic validity.
Emotional harm has been generally classified as "humiliation,
embarrassment, emotional distress, and other such intangible
harms to the plaintiff's personality."' 7' The effects of emotional
63. Id. at 81. Constitutional torts or civil rights torts concern the intentional depri-
vation of a right protected by the Constitution, or a federal statute. Id. at 81-84. The
most common constitutional torts involve Fourth Amendment claims, Eighth Amend-
ment claims, and Fourteenth Amendment claims, including any of the procedural or
substantive protections flowing from the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 84.
64. Id. at 824-25.
65. Id. at 822-23. Negligent infliction of emotional distress has no bearing on
housing discrimination claims because once there is a finding of discrimination, the
act is considered intentional.
66. Schwemm, supra note 22, at 121.
67. Id. at 85-86.
68. See DOBBS, supra note 50, at 81-82. "Civil rights violations are torts. They
have generated an important specialty in which the courts look to common law tort
rules as models without necessarily accepting their limitations." Id.
69. Martell v. Boardwalk Enter. Inc., 748 F.2d. 740, 750 (2d Cir. 1984).
70. See, e.g., Johnson v. Hale, 940 F.2d 1192, 1193-94 (9th Cir. 1991).
71. SCHWEMM, supra note 18, at 25-21.
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harm in housing discrimination cases may also lead to increased
anger, frustration, depression, resentment, or shame.72 Fear that
the discriminatory event will reoccur may lead to withdrawal from
contact with others or diminished social involvement with friends
or family.73 Physical symptoms may also accompany the psycho-
logical trauma.7 1 These may include indigestion, ulcers, nervous-
ness, loss of appetite, loss of sleep, impotence, nausea, and
intensified allergic reactions.75
While compensation for the loss of rights that are protected by
statute or the Constitution is a well accepted legal principle, only
nominal damages are generally awarded for lost rights.76 As a re-
sult, many victims must rely on their emotional harm claim as their
primary basis for economic compensation. Two reasons immedi-
ately come to mind for taking special care to develop the emotional
damages phase of a housing discrimination case. First, in most in-
stances, the economic losses, or the out-of-pocket expenses that re-
sult from housing discrimination, are not typically extensive.77 By
the time the issues are litigated, the plaintiff will likely have found
alternative housing.78 Secondly, the emotional harm experienced is
often one of the primary motives for seeking legal redress, but that
motivation might diminish if it is not acknowledged and developed
early in a case.79
72. See Complaint No. FH5841219900 at D34 to D35, Mitchell v. DiSilva (No. 93-
130) New York City Commission of Human Rights, Recommended Decision and Or-
der, Dec. 12, 1993. In this case Dr. Hugh Butts, a psychiatrist specializing in the ef-
fects of discrimination, testified as an expert witness about the general symptoms of
victims of discrimination as including feelings of numbness, withdrawal, difficulty in
concentrating and focusing, depression, anxiety, and the diminished quality of care
given to children. Id. at D-34 to D-39.
73. Id. at D-34 to D-35.
74. Id. at D-34.
75. Alan W. Heifetz & Thomas C. Heinz, Separating the Objective, the Subjective:
Assessing Compensatory Damages In Fair Housing Cases, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 3,
20 (1992).
76. SCHWEMM, supra note 18, at 25-21 to 25-23.
77. Id. at 25-24 ("Most fair housing cases do not involve major economic loss.").
78. See id. at 25-23 (noting that many plaintiffs mitigate damages by securing alter-
native housing). While these issues certainly vary from case to case, in most markets
the difference in cost between the housing that was denied and the housing that the
victim eventually had to accept will not be great. Id. at 25-23 to 25-24. In mortgage
discrimination cases this may vary because the difference of even a point amortized
over the life of a mortgage can be considerable, but injunctive remedies would typi-
cally require the renegotiation of the mortgage before the difference in value had
accumulated to a substantial degree. See ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMI-
NATION: LAW AND LITIGATION 25-14 (1994).
79. See, e.g., Joe R. Feagin, The Continuing Significance of Race: Anti-Black Dis-
crimination in Public Places, 56 AM. Soc. REV. 101, 101 (1991) (describing the range
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Early decisions have implicitly recognized the link between dis-
crimination and emotional distress by generally allowing some
monetary recovery for intangible harm if there is credible evidence
to support it.8 Usually, these damage claims are established
through the testimony of the plaintiff about the emotional impact
of the discrimination.8' Emotional harm may even be inferred
from the circumstances of the housing transaction.82 Moreover,
there is no requirement of corroborating testimony of any kind and
no requirement for expert medical evidence to establish a claim.83
While traditional tort theory usually requires a showing of outra-
geous conduct by the defendant and severe emotional harm for re-
covery,84 this higher standard has not been applied in housing
discrimination cases. This seemingly relaxed standard, however,
may create the false impression that emotional harm damages are
relatively easy to establish and are uniformly receiving wide ac-
ceptance.86 While the approach by the courts to find emotional
harm by inference is both significant and appropriate, the related
inference, that the fact-finder can accurately assess the extent of
the trauma from the testimony of the victim alone seems less sup-
ported by a careful review of damage awards.
In fact, Professor Schwemm, in his chronicle of housing discrimi-
nation cases, has pointed out that severe and particularly outra-
geous conduct by the defendant, along with the nature of the
plaintiff's reaction, continue to be critical factors in receiving
favorable recognition of emotional harm.8 7 While this assessment
of responses to racist events by African-Americans that usually begin with an assess-
ment of the situation and include consideration of a range of responses from immedi-
ate self help/direct confrontation to challenging the act through a lawsuit).
80. Id.; SCHWEMM, supra note 18, at 25-31 to 25-33.
81. SCHWEMM, supra note 18 at 25-31 to 25-32.
82. Marable v. Walker, 704 F.2d 1219, 1220 (11th Cir. 1.983) ("damages for emo-
tional distress in cases of this type 'may be inferred from the circumstances as well as
proved by the testimony.'").
83. SCHWEMM, supra note 18, at 25-32.
84. DoBBS, supra note 50, at 81.
85. See, e.g., Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., 491 F.2d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 1974); Parker v.
Shonfeld, 409 F. Supp. 876, 880 (N.D. Cal. 1976); see also Schwemm, supra note 22, at
115.
86. See, e.g., SCHWEMM, supra note 18, at 25-32 to 25-33. He comments that courts
exercise a great deal of discretion in these matters. Id. at 25-36; see Schwemm, supra
note 22, at 84-86 (describing the absence of clear standards or a predictable pattern to
predict the strength of a claim for emotional harm).
87. SCHWEMM, supra note 18, at 25-37. it is important to note, however, that the
reliance on the outrageousness of the defendants' conduct by some judges in cases
that Professor Schwemm has tracked is more similar to the requirements of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress from tort theory. Even though the courts have
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accurately reflects how courts have been leaning towards tradi-
tional tort theory in housing cases, it also points to some of the
inherent flaws in this approach. Although racial epithets or threats
of violence clearly meet the outrageous conduct requirement under
traditional tort theory and have caused some courts to award high
damage awards, the typical discrimination case today involves
more subtle forms of discrimination. 8 Even though different
forms of discrimination may vary in intensity or in relative degree
of personal threat, this fact does not automatically mean that sig-
nificantly less emotional harm has occurred.89
Plaintiffs will react differently to the same adverse stimuli.90 The
impact of racism must be understood in the context of both the
incident and the parties involved. Important contextual issues to
examine include whether this is the first time the plaintiff at-
tempted to find new housing, whether the plaintiff is seeking to
change their neighborhood circumstances, or if there is a spouse or
child depending on the plaintiff to find suitable housing. These are
only a few variables that can affect the plaintiff's emotional re-
sponse to the adverse stimulus of discrimination.
Furthermore, as Professor Schwemm has pointed out, the suc-
cess or failure of an emotional harm claim often depends on
"whether the plaintiff is believable, likeable, or vulnerable to
stress, and whether the fact-finder is receptive to this type of
never required this approach, and have regularly applied the more relaxed standard
that implicitly rejects it, there remains a tendency for some courts to view the emo-
tional harm suffered by the plaintiff as directly proportional to the defendants' con-
duct. See, e.g., id. While this may apply to some cases, the danger here is that it
should not be applied as a general rule. The reasons why this approach inevitably
fails to capture the real damages experienced by many victims of discrimination will
be discussed more fully in Part II.
88. Teresa Coleman Hunter & Gary L. Fischer, Fair Housing Testing- Uncover-
ing Discriminatory Practices, 28 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1127, 1128 (1995) ("While cer-
tainly not universally true, the general nature of race-based housing discrimination is
covert, although overt discrimination still exists.").
89. See Ezra H. Griffith & Elwin J. Griffith, Racism, Psychological Injury and
Compensatory Damages, 37 Hosp. & CMTY. PSYCHIATRY 71, 72 (1994). The authors
indicate that courts tend to review these cases from the traditional intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress framework. Id. This assumes that once the act and the
proximate cause is established, the distress will be directly proportionate to the sever-
ity of the act. Id. While there may be sound public policy reasons for this approach,
such as deterrence of egregious acts, it fails as sound medical science because the
psyche of each individual is different. Id. at 74. Some members of racial minority
groups may have steeled themselves against racial slights, whereas others are far more
sensitive. Id. Overall, the authors argue "greater psychiatric input would result in a
better assessment of emotional distress so that plaintiffs can produce their evidence of
psychological damage in a more professional framework." Id. at 75.
90. Id. at 73.
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claim.9 It is unfortunate that this subjectivity of perception inher-
ent to a certain degree in all cases, that opens the "objective" fact-
finding process to the distortions of skewed racial perceptions.
This possibility is heightened when the fact finder must consider
cross-cultural empathy and how racism affects society. This is a
task for which judges and juries may not have had any special
training, but which is critical to fully evaluate the evidence of dis-
crimination and its effect on an individual plaintiff.
Regardless of the court's willingness to accept only plaintiff's tes-
timony to establish an emotional harm claim, other factors should
be considered before relying entirely on the victim to fully articu-
late the nature of the harm suffered. "Many plaintiffs will lack in-
sight into their [psychological] injuries, particularly when the harm
[from emotional stress may] develop slowly over a protracted pe-
riod [of time]."92 Secondly, they may be poorly equipped to com-
pare themselves with other healthy individuals, particularly when
discriminatory events are common in the lives of people of color.93
There may also be social disincentives or factors that discourage
plaintiffs from acknowledging and exhibiting their private senti-
ments about their injury.94 It is also not uncommon for victims of
discrimination to suppress any discussion about their injuries, espe-
cially if being open and forthcoming might cause them to reveal
issues of sexual or emotional vulnerability. 9 This is particularly
true in an environment where social norms characterize people
who display anger or pain as weak or unprofessional. 96
Each of these factors argues for two careful considerations in
presenting this phase of a discrimination case. First, the ability of
the fact-finder to fully comprehend the effects of racism should not
be assumed. It must be developed as fully as possible within the
limitations of the trial.97 Considerable social science data points to
91. Schwemm, supra note 22, at 116. This judicially preferred approach to plain-
tiff's testimony can also create a double bind. In order to establish liability and to be
seen as believable on factual issues, a client must be seen as objective, reliable, and
not susceptible to overstatement or instability. Id. But a plaintiff's success in convey-
ing these very attributes can create the impression that they were not devastated by
the defendant's conduct. Id. at 121.
92. Goodman-Delahunty & Foote, supra note 61, at 187.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 187-88. This not only raises issues concerning the willingness of a plain-
tiff to reveal this aspect of themselves in open court, but also their willingness or
ability to be exposed to their lawyer.
97. Compare Portee v. Hastava, 853 F. Supp. 597 (E.D.N.Y. 1994), with Broome v.
Biondi, 17 F. Supp. 2d 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). In Portee, the district court judge re-
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significant cultural and experiential differences in how whites and
people of color perceive the same information.98 Therefore, it may
be necessary to construct a "cultural bridge" as part of the trial
strategy before the cross-cultural empathy can be established. Sec-
ondly, although the focus of proof must be on the individual plain-
tiff, and not on the experience of any particular group, the
connection of the plaintiff to her group is also critical.99
Finally, feminist literature offers useful insights on how harm in a
social context gets transformed, distorted, or not recognized at all
when translated into a legal context. Several of these feminist the-
ories offer transferable lessons for race discrimination cases. In her
essay discussing the experience of women and traditional legal con-
cepts of harm, Professor Suzanne Levitt states that "the compara-
versed the jury verdict of $100,000 for each of the two adult plaintiffs and $80,000 for
their child, calling it clearly outrageous and shocking to the judicial conscience. Por-
tee, 853 F. Supp. at 613-14. On the other hand, in Biondi, the judge upheld emotional
harm damages totaling $114,000 dollars for each of the two plaintiffs in a suit against a
co-op that had discriminated against a middle class interracial couple who were both
professionals. Biondi, 17 F. Supp. 2d at 215, 226. While the difference between these
two awards may correctly be attributed to the different financial capacities of the
defendants, it is also clear that Judge Carter in the Biondi case was already very famil-
iar with emotional harm issues from his own practice as a lawyer with the NAACP.
The History Makers Biography, Robert Carter, at http://www.thehistorymakers.com/
biography/biography.asp?bioindex=106&category=LawMakers (last visited Mar. 15,
2003). In Portee, the record suggests that the judge approached the case with some
degree of skepticism, despite testimony that the discrimination caused the husband to
withdraw, start drinking, have problems at work, and begin to doubt his ability to
support his family. Portee, 853 F. Supp. at 608 n.7. His wife testified that she lost
some concentration at work and was depressed. Id. at 607-08. The court seemed
particularly critical that neither party sought medical assistance, despite testimony on
how the loss of their preferred rental plunged their lives into turmoil. Id. at 608. He
also cited a string of low emotional harm awards and reduced the jury's verdict. Id. at
616. While cases with such different facts cannot form a symmetrical comparison, a
few important issues do seem relevant. The Biondi plaintiff's testimony did not char-
acterize their trauma as significantly greater than the Portees to warrant twice the
damages. See Biondi, 17 F. Supp. 2d at 223. Both cases involved discrimination of a
subtle type, and neither involved confrontations or public humiliation. It is possible
that a significant factor in the difference of the awards was the level of knowledge
about emotional trauma and discrimination possessed by the judge.
98. See infra Part II.
99. See, e.g., Landrine & Klonoff, supra note 33, at 147. The authors argue that
"Afrocentric consciousness," or a strong sense of group identity:
may be a personality factor (like hardiness for generic life events) which
moderates the negative impact of racist events. By providing a cognitive
framework for understanding and responding to racist events, an Afro-cen-
tric consciousness should decrease the perception of racist events as one's
own fault, increase adaptive coping, increase social support seeking, and
thereby decrease the negative health and psychological impact of these
events.
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tive model (of harm) begins with the assumption that what 'is,'
ordinarily, is not harm. Instead, harm is a deviation from what is
considered ordinary."' 0 She also points out that as various forms
of the oppression of women have historically been accepted as so-
cial norms, this social reality in turn influences and even dominates
our legal concepts of what constitutes harm.'0' The effect of this
social process over time is that the very pervasiveness of particular
types of harm against women renders it normative, thereby diffi-
cult to legally accept as worthy of a significant or substantial judi-
cial response.'0 2 The very pervasiveness of forms of gender
oppression (which can include racism), creates a social context that
supports the belief that some degree of this phenomenon is inevita-
ble, and therefore not within the calculus of a gross deviation from
what is expected to be the pitfalls of normal existence. Thus, when
fact-finders are asked to see the behavior of individuals who com-
mit acts that are racist or sexist, as harmful, if they have even subtly
accepted the "normativeness" of these practices either consciously
or unconsciously, they must first make a cultural and social pro-
gression beyond their own experience and beliefs before the legal
parameters of what must be done can become clear.
A parallel dilemma arises for the victims of discrimination when
subtle, yet pervasive forms of racism are accepted as social norms.
Because people of color inevitably develop the capacity to perse-
vere in spite of assaults on their dignity, this very capacity can cre-
ate the impression that the emotional harm that they experience is
not severe.' 3 Similarly, on an internal level, this coping capacity
can transform itself into a pattern of denial by victims of the sever-
ity of their trauma and become rationalized as a necessary adjust-
ment to the harsh realities of life. 04 It is important for both
advocates and fact-finders to understand this phenomenon in eval-
uating emotional harm. While society has made progress in chang-
ing old norms and valuing the experiences of people of color and
100. Suzanne J. Levitt, Rethinking Harm: A Feminist Essay, 34 WASHBURN L.J. 531,
532 (1995).
101. Id. at 532-33.
102. See id. at 537-38. Leavitt cites judicial responses to sexual harassment and
spousal abuse cases as examples of social harm. Id. at 534-38. She attributes the slow
and grudging acceptance/non-acceptance of these social harms into the traditional le-
gal framework as background radiation, potentially worthy of attention, but basically
like background noise, something that individuals are aware of, but learn to tolerate.
Id. at 532-33.
103. See, e.g., Landrine & Klonoff, supra note 33, at 146.
104. Goodman-Delahunty & Foote, supra note 61, at 185-87.
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women, social science studies clearly demonstrate that more work
still needs to be done.
II. THE POTENTIAL FOR BIAS BY JUDGES AND JURIES
A. Some Social Science Evidence
1. Bias as a Form of Racism
Whenever one begins a discussion of racial issues, it is critical at
the outset to clarify language and definitions. Bias, or prejudice, as
a general concept is a component of the set of beliefs or values that
form the categories in which individuals view the world and organ-
ize the information acquired.10 5 Forming these categories is a nor-
mal process and helps to psychologically process the myriad of
information received 0 6 These inputs are, for the most part, ra-
tional in that they are built upon accurate information.11 7 The as-
sociations that individuals create from these categories tend to
follow and reflect a normal pattern of logical thinking."",
On the other hand, this process of creating categories also leads
to the forming of clusters, and projecting the characteristics that
are assigned to the cluster onto individual phenomena. °9 The
most common result of this process occurs when attention is not
paid to the details or particularities of the individual phenomena,
and individuals unconsciously accept ideas based on the projection
or juxtaposition that is applied from the category to the larger clus-
ter."'0 Ordinary bias results when this process presents an oversim-
plification of the world and a distortion or inaccuracy based on
one's limited experience, inability, or aversion to see the illogic or
incompleteness of those views."' The tendency is to at least ini-
tially form ideas about the world in keeping with first-hand experi-
ence, even though this may include projections of fantasy,
105. ALLPORT, supra note 36, at 6-14.
106. Id. at 27 ("[M]an has a propensity to prejudice. This propensity lies in his
normal tendency to form generalizations, concepts and categories, whose content rep-
resents an oversimplification of his world of experience.").
107. Id. at 22. ("[G]enerally a category starts to grow up from a 'kernel of truth.' A
rational category does so, and enlarges and solidifies itself through the increment of
relevant experience.").
108. Id. ("Categories may be more or less rational ... Scientific laws are examples
of rational categories. They are backed up by experience ... Even if the laws are not
100 percent perfect, we consider them rational if they have a high probability of pre-
dicting a happening.").
109. Id. at 20.
110. Id. at 21.
111. Id. ("This principle holds even though we often make mistakes in fitting events
to categories and thus get ourselves into trouble.").
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emotional issues, or information acquired and accepted through so-
cial and cultural influences.I 2
Racial bias, as the term is used here, is the extension of this pro-
cess as it is formed and shaped by the historical and cultural pat-
terns of race and racism in America." 13 This social process has
resulted in a distorted and stereotyped projection of a dominant
and normative "I" and a different and subordinate "other" onto
the categories of race." 4 More importantly, racial bias is a reflec-
tion of a failing to bridge this gap by consciously accepting accurate
information, which moves away from stereotypes and relies rigor-
ously upon logical thinking and individualization." 5
In 1954, Professor Gordon Allport, in his critical study, The Na-
ture of Prejudice, advanced the theory that logical thinking is more
often the norm for most Americans." 6 In fact, up to eighty percent
of white Americans harbored enough antagonism toward members
of racial minority groups that it would likely affect their behavior
112. Id. at 27. It should also be noted that this pattern of thinking is not limited to
whites as a dominant social group. Members of minority groups can also be biased
based on their perceptions of other groups and their misapplication of false group
characteristics to an individual. Id. at 38-39. Discrimination is distinguished here be-
tween interpersonal bias, which operates across racial, ethnic, and gender boundaries,
and institutional bias, which is socially constructed by those who control the major
social institutions in society. Bernice Lott & Diane Maluso, Introduction: Framing the
Question to THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERPERSONAL DISCRIMINATION, supra
note 29, at 2-3.
113. See generally JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM (7th ed.
1994), for a full historical treatment of racism in America. While the literature on
race and racial discrimination in America is too voluminous to note here, one seminal
work does stand out. An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern De-
mocracy has been a foundation for work by modern scholars of all disciplines on
racial discrimination. GUNNER MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO
PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY (1962). Myrdal's study chronicled the history
and pervasiveness of discrimination and bias in American culture, and argued that
until those issues were addressed America would never attain the status of a full and
complete democracy. Id. at 1020-24.
114. ALLPORT, supra note 36, at 37, 41 (describing a person in-group and a personal
reference group in contrast with "an outsider").
115. See Charles Lawrence, The Id, Ego and Racial Discrimination: Reckoning With
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987). Lawrence's theory suggests
that individuals are infected by the biases inherent in a racist society. Id. Utilizing a
psychoanalytical model, he argues that as long as society reflects racial domination
and subordination in its social structure, individuals will be subconsciously influenced
by these stimuli, and will tend to reflect them in various ways. Id. at 322-23. When
this occurs, despite the best efforts toward objective thinking, all will subconsciously
project the emotional and experiential issues that were referred to in Allport's work
on prejudice. Id. at 337. This results in so-called "objective legal standards" actually
being constructed on flawed, unconscious foundations. Id. at 344-45.
116. ALLPORT, supra note 36, at 17-27.
2003] EMOTIONAL HARM: LINGERING PROBLEM 1165
in some way on a daily basis.II 7 He viewed these findings as evi-
dence supporting his theory on the social reproduction of racial
bias. 118 One significant aspect of Allport's early theories was that
he did not see these distortions as in any way inevitable or linked
to human nature.1 19 While he found evidence to explain racial bias
as mostly affected by social and cultural variables that influenced
and shaped attitudes, his theories were broad and eclectic enough
to recognize the role of cognitive influences as well.12°
The importance of his dual perspective of cognitive and social
factors is two fold. First, Allport focused on the social dimensions
of racism, particularly how the reformation of social institutions
that had been constructed along lines based on racial stereotypes
could be restructured.1 2' But he did not see this as the only ap-
proach to attacking racism. 122 He also recognized that the cogni-
tive inputs that shape belief, perception, and consciousness are not
intrinsic to human behavior. 12 3 Thus, he saw the social and cultural
variables, reflected in racist beliefs and causing racist behavior as
117. Id. at 78.
118. Id. at 79. Allport moved away from theories that characterized racism as an
aberrant individual psychosis and instead saw it as a distinctly social phenomena with
deep historical origins. Id. at 208-13.
119. Id. at 17-19.
120. Id. at 165-77. While later cognitive theorists would expand considerably on
Allport's work, his initial studies laid the framework for later experiments that
demonstrated that racially biased beliefs did not always follow Allport's continuum
and become discriminatory conduct. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our
Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Op-
portunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1186-88 (1995). In fact, the cognitive theorists argue
that racial biases are often a set of unconscious constructs and beliefs. Id. at 1188.
Behavior may then follow these cognitive pathways without ever manifesting as a
rational or conscious decision of choice. Id. For an excellent discussion of these theo-
ries and how they demonstrate the counter-productive aspects of anti-discrimination
law, especially the intent standard in Title VII jurisprudence, see id. at 1204-07.
121. ALLPORT, supra note 36, at 504-13.
122. Id. at 469, 477, 493, 495, 510 (describing how racism can be attacked by chang-
ing laws, a greater role for social scientists in government, and appropriate use of the
mass media, particularly influential media, like film, individual therapy, and inter-
cultural education).
123. See deCarvalho, supra note 60, at 299. Allport was critical of a purely psycho-
analytic approach to prejudice because of its tendency to see discriminatory behavior
as the reflection of "infantile, repressed, defensive, and irrational" parts of the human
psyche. Id. at 303. Allport did accept some aspects of the psychoanalytic theory. Id.
at 303-04. In particular, he saw the perpetrators of discrimination as often developing
fears and aggressions that were turned against minorities, but he rejected the idea that
these were impulses that might affect individuals. Id. at 304. He strongly urged the
view that racial bias was more a situational construct, created by social forces and,
therefore, more susceptible than the psychoanalytic construct to change through
countering social forces. Id.
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being susceptible to reformation through conscious social policy.' 24
This theory, in fact, has supported the main public policy rationale
underlying civil rights laws and enforcement efforts. 25 At the
same time, while the more cognitive elements of his theory have
been the subject of numerous social science research efforts, very
little is known about how to translate those findings into broad,
meaningful social results. 126  This may account for the fact that
while beliefs about race in this country have undergone significant
positive change, many forms of racially influenced behaviors have
changed much more slowly, or in some cases very little at all. 127
The cognitive theorists who have been able to shed further insight
on why information designed to dispel stereotypes and biases is not
always reflected in a social context have drawn from and expanded
on Allport's theory. They have pointed out how the changes in
social structures, particularly those reflected in the law, are often
removed from the day-to-day experiences of most citizens and do
124. Id. at 304-06.
125. For an example of a positivist approach to anti-discrimination echoing All-
port's theory, see CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE:
A LIGISLATIvI " His-'oi y OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS Acr 1 (1985) ("The legal reme-
dies [President Kennedy] have proposed are the embodiment of this nation's basic
posture of common sense and common justice."); see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
U.S. 483, 495 (1954) ("we conclude that in the field of education separate but equal
has no place."). There are numerous examples of a positivist approach to anti-dis-
crimination principles that echo Allport's view that racial bias is learned behavior,
reinforced by social conditions, but behavior that can and should be changed. The
most influential is Brown, with its bold pronouncement that separate but equal was no
longer consistent with the premise of the Fourteenth Amendment. Brown, 347 U.S.
at 495. Another is Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)
(2003). Each represents a sweeping view of the potential for change, albeit a vision
frequently unrealized.
126. See Krieger, supra note 120, at 1168-69 (arguing that the entire theoretical
framework for the intent standard formulated by the Supreme Court in Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). is based on a flawed understanding of how conscious deci-
sions concerning race actually occur).
127. A dramatic example of this dissonance between attitudes and behavior has
been chronicled in American Apartheid. In this extensive examination of housing pat-
terns in the post Title Vill period, these authors have reluctantly concluded that Afri-
can-Americans face high degrees of racial isolation in almost every major American
city. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 7, at 76. They also found that the vast majority
of African-Americans support the ideal of integration. Id. at 88. They reported
surveys of white Americans that revealed that by 1978, eighty-eight percent of whites
supported the basic principle of non-discrimination in the housing market. id. at 91.
But white Americans "remain uncomfortable about its implications in practice and
are reluctant to support legislation to implement it. Moreover, negative stereotypes
about black neighbors remain firmly entrenched in white psyches." Id. at 92.
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not automatically reproduce themselves as new beliefs and
behaviors. 128
2. The Impact of Cultural Bias
Researchers from the National Opinion Research Center
("NORC") have sought to explain the discrepancy between atti-
tudes about race and social behavior as the "lag effect theory."1 29
This theory contends that as civil rights laws and changing social
attitudes interact to form new social norms, there will always be a
lag time between the belief in equality as a social ideal and a corre-
sponding change in social behavior. 30 This "gap" means that while
individuals are forming new ideas and value, they may continue to
be influenced by older beliefs. 13 1
Attitudes on matters of race have changed a great deal since the
1940s.' 32 More recent studies show that on many levels whites, as a
group, are willing to reject many of the extreme stereotypes that
have historically been common components of American culture
and have strongly influenced white people's perceptions of people
of color, particularly African-Americans. 133
128. For an excellent description of cognitive theory, see Krieger, supra note 120, at
1161-66. In analyzing the basic flaws in current Title VII jurisprudence, particularly
its reliance on findings of intentional discrimination to justify a remedy, she describes
how this standard is at odds with cognitive psychological theory. Id. at 1166-68. In
summarizing cognitive theory, she points out that its key element is that people act on
Allport's categories, also referred to as schemas. Id. at 1188. But, for the most part,
individuals do so without a conscious awareness. Id. Since these behaviors lie outside
general awareness, they are also rarely the object of institutional constructs. Id. at
1213-17. In other words, institutional racism is not seen, because individuals do not
see themselves as racist. Id. In the Title VII field, this results in constructing a legal
rule about intentional conduct that is inconsistent with what is known about human
behavior. In Krieger's view, this results in a whole set of unconsciously motivated
conduct that will never meet a conscious standard for intentional behavior. Id. at
1217. This flaw is compounded because the "racial blind spot" gets transformed into a
rule supposedly designed to help find and respond to racial discrimination. Id.
129. See HOWARD SCHUMAN ET AL., RACIAL ATTITUDES IN AMERICA: TRENDS
AND INTERPRETATIONS 135-36 (1985). The lag effect represents the time it takes for
an expressed attitude to become internalized. Id. It is then that the individual's be-
havior is most likely to fall in synchronization with their expressed values. Id. The
authors caution that this is a hypothesis drawn from the data and there are some
studies that are inconsistent with this theory. Id. They point out that school integra-
tion shows an inverse relationship to the data, with the increase in implementation
resulting in a decrease in attitudinal support. Id. at 136.
130. Id. at 135.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 193-95.
133. See id. For example, in 1958, only four percent of whites surveyed supported
interracial marriage. Id. at 74-76. By 1983, that figure had increased to forty percent.
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NORC has tracked these "racial attitudes" by utilizing research
questionnaires that recorded the answers to a similar series of
questions asked repeatedly from 1942 to 1983.134 This method pro-
vided a reliable way of evaluating and comparing changes in atti-
tudes over time. In areas such as views on interracial marriage,
and willingness to accept African-Americans in neighborhoods, in
schools, or social venues, the early responses all showed the depth
of racial bias prior to the modern civil rights era. 35 They have also
tracked the steady upward acceptance trend, demonstrating the
moderation of open racial hostility and the formation of beliefs
that reflect a rejection of, or at least a meaningful distancing from,
racial stereotypes and biases. 136 In keeping with Allport's early
theories, these NORC surveys have led to the conclusion that
many older racial stereotypes have given way to more accurate,
non-stereotypical thinking about people of color. 137 More impor-
tantly for this analysis of race and emotional harm, this trend also
reflects the upward trend in the ability of most whites to perceive
African-Americans with the same degree of sympathy and empa-
thy as they with other white people. 138 The data reveals a more
Id. While this is hardly an unqualified endorsement of a fully integrated society, it
does illustrate the trend toward greater acceptance.
134. Id. at 45-46, 55.
135. Id. at 193.
136. Id. at 193-94
137. Id. at 193-95. In 1997, when asked how they felt about a relative marrying an
African-American, sixty-seven percent of whites surveyed either opposed or strongly
opposed the idea. Maria Krysan, Comments on the 2002 Data Update to Racial Atti-
tudes in America: Trends and Interpretations Revised Edition (2002), at http://tig-
ger.uic.edu/-krysan/writeup.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2003). The most recent data
from the 2000 survey shows opposition declining to thirty-eight percent. Id. In an-
other attitudinal question, whites were asked how they felt about living in a neighbor-
hood that was fifty percent African-American. Id. In 1990, forty-eight percent
opposed or strongly opposed the idea. Id. In 2000, that figure went down to thirty-
one percent. Id.
138. SCHUMAN ET AL., supra note 129, at 202. These NORC studies focused on
residential integration, school integration, job treatment, public facilities, the political
arena, personal relations, and general attitudes about African-Americans and current
events. Id. at 47-48, 53. Unfortunately, many of the questions in the NORC survey
were designed to examine the extreme forms of racism that were open, prevalent, and
reflected the social policy of the day. They are less useful in discerning the more
subtle aspects of racism. Nevertheless, their findings are a barometer of how deeply
entrenched aspects of racial antipathy are in American culture. For example, in the
housing arena, one question simply asked whether one supported the idea of a free
market seller's choice, even if that permitted racial discrimination, or a fair housing
law that prohibited discrimination. Id. at 97. In 1972, only thirty-five percent of
northerners supported fair housing, and by 1982, that number had risen to about
forty-seven percent. Id. Southern responses lagged ten points behind those modest
figures. Id. These studies also reflect the distinction in white people's belief in equal-
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complex and multi-dimensional picture about racial attitudes that
supports optimism, but also gives some credence to the argument
that perceptual bias remains strong and prevalent in our society,
and that the key players in the judicial process can hardly be ex-
pected to be fully immune to it.
In 1980, a team of psychologists conducted a review of a number
of studies on unobtrusive discrimination and prejudice. 139 The
value of their work, as it applies to the arguments in this Article,
lies in two key areas. First, they carefully reviewed a vast body of
literature in the field of racial studies generally focusing on those
that sought to measure the current level of anti-black prejudice and
discrimination among whites. 141 Second, they employed a defini-
tion of racism that is very close to the definition of racial bias extra-
polated from Allport's work and employed in this Article.141 Their
findings correlate closely with the thesis of this Article that percep-
tual bias remains strong in society and is, therefore, likely to be
present in the process of assessing how an African-American plain-
tiff may have been harmed by discrimination.1 42 In their review of
the literature on cross-cultural racial perceptions, the authors reit-
erated the findings supported by the NORC polling data that "anti-
black attitudes were prevalent and moderately strong among the
white population as a whole at least until the late 1950's and early
1960's. "143 They point out, however, that new surveys and studies
from 1963 through the 1970s generally interpreted the NORC data
ity as a principle, versus their support of concrete policies to enforce that principle.
For example, more than ninety percent of whites currently support the principle of
equal treatment in employment, jobs, schools, and public accommodations, but the
figures for support for government action to enforce that principle are considerably
lower. Id. at 135. Two other trends emerge. The more interpersonal the proposed
integration, the less support there is for government enforcement. Id. at 136. Con-
versely, there is more support for public activities, such as public accommodations.
Id.
139. Faye Crosby et al., Recent Unobtrusive Studies of Black and White Discrimina-
tion and Prejudice: A Literature Review, 87 PSYCHOL. BULL. 546, 546 (1980).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 546.
Racism has been defined in a variety of ways. For clarity of exposition, we
follow P. Katz and define racism as the differential treatment of individuals
on the basis of their racial group membership. Racism may be examined at
two levels: One may measure discriminatory behavior, and one may infer
prejudiced attitudes. Stereotyping, which involves the presumption of cer-
tain attributes in an individual solely on the basis of racial groups, is one
form of prejudice.
Id. (citations omitted).
142. Id. at 547.
143. Id. at 547-48
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as revealing a significant decrease in racist attitudes and a signifi-
cant increase in pro-integrationist and racially unbiased views.'44
This led to a number of other studies that concluded that diminish-
ing racial prejudice in society was a definite trend, and some even
to argue that "antiblack prejudice was no longer pervasive in the
American white population." 145 They also found, however, that
many of these studies relied on self-reporting, typical of question-
naire data, and were contradicted by other studies that demon-
strated a dissonance between reported attitudes about race and
actual behavior in racially integrated settings. 146 One study, for ex-
ample, showed that college-age white women registered no
prejudice on a questionnaire, but when they believed that the ques-
tionnaire would be the basis for actually assigning roommates, they
showed significantly more prejudice towards African-
Americans. 147
The unobtrusive discrimination studies that they conducted
sought to resolve these discrepancies between values and behavior
by examining experiments that fell into three categories: (1) help-
ing behavior studies; (2) aggression studies; and (3) nonverbal be-
havioral studies. 48  In addition, they reviewed a number of
laboratory experiments that were difficult to classify, but were de-
signed to measure how race affected the perceptions of white test
subjects. 149 Each of these studies would measure the level of em-
pathy white subjects exhibited toward African-Americans. In the
helping studies, staged scenarios were acted out with a white actor
in need of assistance, and the identical situation was replayed
where the actor was an African-American.1 50 Their results demon-
strated a clear preference among the white subjects for providing
more assistance to the white actor.' 51 The aggression studies in-
volved laboratory experiments where white test subjects had an op-
portunity to express aggression toward an African-American or
white participant who was the target in a setting that was designed
to allow for aggressive behavior to be socially acceptable. 5 2 These
144. Id. at 548.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 547.
149. Id. at 549-56.
150. Id. at 548.
151. Id. at 549.
152. Id. at 552. These studies involved role playing where the subject played the
role of a teacher and the student, who was really part of the experiment, could be
given a bogus electrical shock based on the number of errors they made in the
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were teacher/student scenarios where the person in the role of
teacher could mete out mild punishment if the student gave incor-
rect answers.1 53 Despite recording some discrepancies in the find-
ings, their conclusion was that "retaliation, censure and anonymity
all affect aggression against black targets, but fail to affect aggres-
sion against white targets. 154 In other words, if the behavior of the
white "teachers" was subject to censure or retaliation, they moder-
ated their response to the African-American subject, but not the
white one. These results suggest a tendency to mask one's true
feelings as long as there are likely negative consequences, but carry
out aggressive responses when there were no likely consequences.
Furthermore, "[t]he data imply that anti-black hostility was perva-
sive, but subtle... [a]ssuming that these subjects are representative
of the general population, we may conclude that whites today con-
tinue to harbor covert hostility toward blacks." 155 When the condi-
tions were safe (for example, anonymous), with no censure from
peers or authority figures, and no possibility for retaliation by the
subject, the hostility was more overt and showed as a tendency to
increase the level of direct aggression. 156 When safe conditions
were not present, the hostility was more indirect. 57
The conclusions from these and other findings provide further
support for the thesis of this Article, that clearly documented and
measured bias in the general population must, to some degree, find
a corresponding reflection in the judicial process that may have an
impact on how the harm caused by discrimination is perceived and
valued.
Another key factor derived from these studies is not simply that
whites tend to perceive African-Americans as different from them-
selves, but that the difference becomes an internalized rationale
and justification for different and often harsher treatment.1 5 8
While the courtroom setting of a discrimination case does not in-
teacher/learner scenario. Id. at 552-53. In certain cases, the student role was played
by a white person and in others by an African-American. Id. The intensity of the
shock was a measure of direct aggression, and the duration was a measure of indirect
aggression. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 554.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. This Article is merging the theories of Allport on the formation of categories
and stereotyped labeling and the studies of Crosby, Bromley, and Saxe that support
Allport's theory of the social and historical influences of racial bias on the formation
of those categories. See Crosby et al., supra note 139, at 548-56.
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volve the anonymity of some of the experiments, the social dis-
tances among the players in the judicial process and the rigidity of
the roles and lines of authority are analogous in many ways to the
test conditions where white test subjects were in positions of au-
thority over an African-American, and their actions were not sub-
ject to supervision or sanction.
Other findings demonstrate additional support that the con-
scious and unconscious perceptions of white fact-finders are liter-
ally and figuratively colored by biases derived from social and
cultural institutions.159 These perceptions are inevitably brought
into the courtroom process and may easily become manifest during
the trial, including the damages phase of the case, when empathy
towards the victim is so crucial to their assessment of the degree of
harm suffered. 160
Evidence from other studies found that in a teacher/student role-
play, whites expected to be treated more harshly by African-Amer-
icans who assumed the teaching (authority) role than by whites in a
similar role.' 61 In a shoplifting study, where an African-American
person and a white person acted out an identical shoplifting scene,
the whites who observed the encounter were more likely to sponta-
neously report and confirm the crime when the actor was an Afri-
can-American than when they observed the white actor in the
identical behavior. 62 Another study measured friendliness toward
a subject in an intercom experiment. 163 When the test subject
159. See, e.g., Krieger, supra note 120, at 1188.
The second claim posited in social cognition theory is that, once in place,
stereotypes bias intergroup judgment and decisionmaking. According to this
view, stereotypes operate as "person prototypes" or "social schemas." As
such, they function as implicit theories, biasing in predictable ways the per-
ception, interpretation, encoding, retention, and recall of information about
other people. These biases are cognitive rather than motivational. They op-
erate absent intent to favor or disfavor members of a particular social group.
And, perhaps most significant for present purposes, they bias a deci-
sionmaker's judgment long before the "moment of decision," as a deci-
sionmaker attends to relevant data and interprets, encodes, stores, and
retrieves it from memory. These biases "sneak up on" the decisionmaker,
distorting bit by bit the data upon which his decision is eventually based.
Id. She further indicates that empirical evidence shows that people's access to their
own cognitive processes is poor. Id. Accordingly, cognitive bias may well be both
unintentional and unconscious. Id.
160. See Schwemm, supra note 22, at 107.
161. Crosby et al., supra note 139, at 554. This perception is important because it
suggests a deeply rooted psychological rationale for their own bias, for example, my
treatment of "them" cannnot be so bad because they would do the same to me. Id.
162. Id. at 554-55.
163. Id. at 555.
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thought the intercom partner was white, the verbal friendliness rat-
ing was positive.' 64 When they thought the partner was African-
American, the friendliness rating was negative. 165 In an interview
study, similar results were recorded. 166 If the interviewee was per-
ceived as African-American, the subjects sat further away from the
interviewee, made more verbal errors, and terminated the inter-
view sooner than if the same scenario was acted out with a white
interviewee. 167 Finally, an experiment utilized a videotape that
contained African-American and white actors playing out identical
scripts that depicted two males in an interaction that culminated in
one shoving the other. 168 The African-American harm-doer was
perceived by white subjects as violent, but when the roles were re-
versed, the white harm-doer was perceived as "playing around.'
' 69
In this study, the white subjects also assigned personality attribu-
tions to the African-American harm-doers, but described identical
behavior by the white actor as situational. 7° Each of these studies,
except the shoplifting experiment, were conducted in laboratory
settings and the subjects all reported themselves on questionnaire
surveys to be liberal.' 71 The shoplifting study, however, carried the
added value of closely duplicating a typical life event without the
artificial qualities of a lab and its findings were consistent with the
lab studies. 72
There are three inescapable conclusions to be drawn from these
studies. First, non-verbal behavior generally lies outside conscious
awareness and therefore control is driven by perceptions and bi-
ases that each individual brings to a situation. 173 This partially ex-
plains the difference between the liberal self-identification of the
test subjects, the positive diminishing bias trend in racial attitudes
164. Id. (noting that friendliness was measured by a scientifically accepted voice
interpretation test).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 556.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 555.
173. See Krieger, supra note 120, at 1190. She notes that:
categorical structures-whether prototypes, stereotypes, or schemas-bias
what we see, how we interpret it, how we encode and store it in memory,
and what we remember about it later. In intergroup relations, these biases,
mediated through perception, inference, and judgment, can result in discrim-
ination, whether we intend it or not, whether we know it or not.
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reflected in questionnaire surveys, and the behavior results re-
corded in the unobtrusive bias studies. Secondly, whites still struc-
ture many aspects of their behavior on the basis of psychologically
rooted biases against African-Americans, and do so in ways that
are beyond their awareness. 174 Finally, although there has been a
marked improvement in the social compliance with the new social
norms of non-discrimination depicted in our laws, many whites
have not internalized these values and made them part of their
conscious behavior patterns. 75 As a result, many whites are still
overly dependent on external control inputs to achieve truly non-
biased conduct.'76 While social control is one of the functions of
our civil rights laws, the conduct of judges and juries do not oper-
ate for the most part, as subjects of those controls. 77 The person-
nel within our judicial system are much more dependent on the
guidance of their own consciousness, or the limited influence of
plaintiffs attorneys in awakening that consciousness as they try and
grapple with the complexities of a trial, including the unknown per-
ceptions of white decision-makers.
There are several possible mitigating factors that should be con-
sidered in examining the degree that perpetual biases can poten-
tially infect the judicial process. Many of the studies cited above
were conducted in the 1970s. If the survey data is accepted as ac-
curate, it means that the NORC trends toward greater racial
awareness and liberalization will have continued for the last
twenty-five years, and the process of white internalization of non-
racist views will have continued to move in a positive direction.
Some of the same studies that measured covert white hostility to-
ward African-Americans also documented how this learned behav-
174. Crosby et al., supra note 139, at 556-57.
175. Id. at 557-59.
176. Id. at 556-57. The Crosby study draws three useful conclusions. First, despite
the differences between attitudes and behavior about race, positive changing attitudes
project a progressive, though not always consistent trend. Id. at 560. Secondly, whites
are not the only group in society affected by bias. Id. Nevertheless, white institu-
tional authority remains stronger than institutions controlled by African-Americans.
See ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS, BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UN-
EQUAL 22-23 (1995). Third, change from overt racism to subtle racism is a positive
change. Crosby et al., supra note 139, at 560. "[W]hites have begun to comply with
an egalitarian and non-racist ideology." Id. One can be hopeful "that internalization
follows." Id.
177. See generally Krieger, supra note 120, at 1186-88. Her thesis is that our em-
ployment discrimination laws, with their requirement that the victim of discrimination
prove that the employer acted intentionally, assumes that we are always aware of the
motivation that causes our behavior. Id. at 1185. This, she points out, is contrary to
the theories and findings from numerous cognitive psychological studies. Id. at 1187.
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ior reflecting bias could very rapidly be unlearned, or at least
controlled, at a behavioral level. 178 When non-racist behavior was
modeled under the same conditions as the aggressive behavior
teacher/learner tests, the white subjects not only moderated their
overt discrimination, but there was no discernable shift to more
covert behavior. 79 In other words, the principles and practices of
equality can be learned and internalized into new behavior pat-
terns with consistent institutional oversight and support. Another
test showed that when there was open censure of discriminatory
behavior, or the potential for that censure on the white test subject,
both overt and indirect aggression was moderated. 180 These find-
ings suggest that even reluctant whites can be brought around to
non-racist behavior through an institutional approach that vigor-
ously and actively promotes those values and carefully monitors
transgressions. Judicial studies on the status of minorities and wo-
men in the courts are positive examples of such an effort. 8 ' While
it may still be too soon to determine the degree of change that has
been brought about by those efforts, they represent an awareness
that eliminating bias requires a conscious and consistent effort. As
laudable as these efforts are, it is not at all clear whether they have
had sufficient reach into the profession and the judiciary to miti-
gate broader social trends from the nation's deeply rooted racial
past.
B. Evidence of Racial Bias in Tort Litigation
Since the Supreme Court formally linked recovery for emotional
harm in housing discrimination cases to the dignitary tort of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, the field of tort law is a likely
source for insights into the presence of racial bias in the judicial
process. This is a particularly salient field since both discrimination
cases and tort litigation focus on the degree and value of the injury
suffered by the plaintiff. Two recent commentators have offered
evidence of two forms of racial bias in the field of tort law. One is
structural, where the preference for formal economic determinants
translates the reality of lower earnings for African-Americans into
a projection of future potential worth.'82 The other is a more sys-
178. Crosby et al., supra note 139, at 552.
179. Id. at 554.
180. Id.
181. See, e.g., 1 REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE JUDICIAL COMMISSION ON MI-
NORITIES, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1-9 (1991).
182. See Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law,
146 U. PA. L. REV. 463, 480-89 (1998) (arguing that the basic categories of physical
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temic bias that supports this Article's thesis of racial mispercep-
tions leading to a chronic undervaluing of African-American
suffering.' 8 3 The structural bias in the process of valuing African-
American claims is depicted in the process of utilizing economic
data to extrapolate an "objective" measure of the worth of an in-
jury.'84 This process inevitably captures the lower earnings of Afri-
can-Americans, which at a societal level is directly linked to
discrimination, and projects that figure into potential future earn-
ings as if all the discriminatory disabilities of the past and present
must inevitably continue into the future. '85 The racial blind spot,
represented by the inability of many white jurists to see this as a
perpetuation of past discrimination and to take steps to eliminate
it, is another example of how the African-American plaintiff is per-
ceived through a racially skewed reality.'86 The available data con-
firms the detrimental economic effects of the continued use of this
standard. In one study, even after adjustments to account for dif-
ferent diseases, general occupation, and age, awards for African-
American plaintiffs were significantly lower than for similarly situ-
ated whites, and in another, averaged only seventy-four percent of
the average white award.' 87
The systemic bias in the field of tort litigation raises different
issues than those confronted in most housing discrimination cases.
In some key aspects, however, they are related. In the typical FHA
case, the plaintiff will only receive compensation if she proves that
she suffered harm, and that it was caused by the conduct of the
injury, property damage, emotional harm, and related harm all reflect deep gender
and racial biases that tend to go unnoticed and unchallenged because they are based
on traditional white middle class male norms ranging from the reasonable man to
comparative actuarial tables).
183. See Frank M. McClellan, The Dark Side of Tort Reform: Searching for Racial
Justice, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 761, 774-77 (1996) (offering data and examples of racial
bias in the courts, the personal injury bar, and the law itself, all of which operate to
the disadvantage of African-American plaintiffs and frequently result in the devalua-
tion of their claims).
184. See Martha Chamallas, Questioning the Use of Race Specific and Gender Spe-
cific Economic Data In Tort Litigation: A Constitutional Argument, 63 FORDHAM L.
REV. 73, 75 (1994) (arguing that the persistent use of economic data that explicitly
utilizes gender and racial classifications is an unjustifiable racial classification, and is
therefore unconstitutional). She further points out the failure of the law to address
the discriminatory effects of job bias, and the continuation of those disabilities into so
called objective measures of lost future earning potential, reflecting not only a racial
bias in the legal process itself, but continuing support for that bias by judges who
refuse to be receptive to alternative formulations. Id. at 75-77.
185. Id. at 75.
186. Chamallas, supra note 182, at 489.
187. Chamallas, supra note 184, at 87.
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defendant.188 As in the typical tort case, some elements of harm
are relatively straightforward. 18 9 But proving the elements of emo-
tional harm in the damages phase of a housing discrimination case,
as in its tort counterpart, involves more than just presenting factual
evidence. It also involves getting judges to understand the case
from the perspective of the plaintiff even though emotional harm
from discrimination is probably far removed from both their expe-
rience and their knowledge. 19° While both civil tort and Title VIII
litigation require direct evidence that emotional harm occurred,
the evaluation of that evidence and the assignment of a monetary
value to it require some understanding and insight into the manner
in which racial discrimination operates.1 91 The fact-finders must
develop a degree of empathy that permits them to evaluate the
experience of discrimination from the perspective of a person of
color. This does not mean uncritically accepting each of the plain-
tiff's assertions as true, but neither can it begin with extreme skep-
ticism about whether discrimination is little more than mildly
embarrassing or inconvenient.1 92 When these cases are viewed in
context, a fuller sense of the real extent of the harm that results
from discrimination can emerge, and a more accurate and mean-
ingful value can be assigned to the harm. Getting fact-finders to
reach that point brings into question issues of perspective, experi-
ence, comprehension, and empathy, as well as all the traditional
legal skills that plaintiff's attorneys must employ to present their
evidence.193 Unfortunately, what the data from a critical race per-
spective on tort litigation reveals is that far too often the depth of
understanding for full fairness for persons of color in the process is
lacking, and the steps necessary to achieve a better understanding
are not being taken.1 94 Other studies of tort litigation have found
188. DOBBS, supra note 50, at 1047-53.
189. SCHWEMM, supra note 18, 25-32.
190. McClellan, supra note 183, at 794.
191. Schwemm, supra note 22, at 121 ("intangible factors will often influence the
judge or jury").
192. While considerable progress has been made, skepticism as well as possible bias
still may influence low jury awards. See Schwemm, supra note 22, at 106-07.
193. See Arlene Sheskin, Trial Courts on Trial: Examining Dominant Assumptions,
in COURTS AND JUDGES 77, 79-82 (James A. Cramer ed., 1981) (describing courtroom
hierarchy affecting decision-making).
194. McClellan, supra note 183, at 771. He points out that "[t]he widely shared
perception of people of color regarding the pervasiveness of the color line issue are
sufficient grounds for discussion of the issue," and he calls for racial orientation and
sensitivity training for judges. Id. at 771, 794. Professor McClellan calls for systematic
empirical studies to examine issues of differential treatment of African-Americans,
particularly in the tort system. Id. at 772-73.
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systemic gender bias in the judicial process as well.1 95 As Professor
McClellan points out, "unfortunately, race often precludes close
empathy with members of other races in tort cases. Race also in-
fluences one's view of what is 'outrageous conduct."" 96
C. The Institutional Devaluation of African-American Life:
Death Penalty Examples
One of the most dramatic examples of how facts can be distorted
when they are examined through a racial prism, occurred with the
Supreme Court's decision in McCleskey v. Kemp. 197 In analyzing
the claim of systematic racial discrimination in capital sentencing,
the Court's decision turned in significant part on their review of a
statistical analysis of the impact of race on the likelihood of capital
punishment, later to be known as the Baldus study.198 This statisti-
cal analysis demonstrated that when capital sentencing is evaluated
even from the perspective of the criminal law's goal of retribution,
the practices of Georgia prosecutors demonstrated that the value
to society of the loss of a white life was four times that of the loss
of an African-American life. 199 A fuller review of race discrimina-
tion in the criminal justice system is beyond the scope of this Arti-
195. In summarizing this finding from a number of judicial commissions, Professor
Judith Resnick quotes from a report by one such body in New York. "The perception
is that minorities are stripped of their human dignity, their individuality and their
identity in their encounters with the court system[.]" Judith Resnick, Ambivalence:
The Resiliency of Culture in the United States, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1525, 1534. She adds
that "[p]hrases like 'there is evidence that bias occurs with disturbing frequency at
every level of the legal profession and court system' are uttered, repeated, printed,
pronounced, but without much in terrorem effect." Id. She also notes that
"[u]nexplained disparities in treatment correlate with membership in minority groups
and even with gender." Id. at 1533.
196. McClellan, supra note 183, at 786.
197. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
198. See id. at 286; Evan Tsen Lee & Ashutosh Bhagwat, The McCleskey Puzzle:
Remedying Prosecutorial Discrimination Against Black Victims in Capital Sentencing,
1998 Sup. Cr. REV. 145,146 (1998). "McCleskey's primary evidence in support of this
claim was the so-called Baldus study, a sophisticated statistical analysis performed by
Professors David C. Baldus, Charles Pulaski, and George Woodworth of the role
played by race in capital sentencing proceedings in Georgia in the 1970s." Id. "The
results of the Baldus study are striking. The race of the victim was an overwhelmingly
important indicator of the likelihood that a capital sentence would be imposed." Id.
at 147. "After controlling for the thirty-nine most relevant nonracial variables, mur-
derers of whites were 4.3 times as likely to receive a death sentence as murderers of
blacks." Id. While this data was used to demonstrate the discriminatory application of
capital sentencing, it also underscores the diminished value of the African-American
victim. Id. at 148.
199. See id. at 149. "[W]e claim that the statistics create a strong suspicion of race
discrimination-specifically, an overvaluation of the white victim's life." Id. at 168.
1178
2003] EMOTIONAL HARM: LINGERING PROBLEM 1179
cle. Yet, it is difficult to imagine how judges and juries in the civil
system can fully comprehend the reasonable measure of the harm
caused by discrimination when they are surrounded by daily exam-
ples of racism reinforced by the institutionally accepted diminished
value of an African-American's life represented by the McCleskey
example.2 °° The skewed social perspectives that are exhibited in
countless criminal cases because of race suggest that seeing an Af-
rican-American in a whole, complete, human dimension, consider-
ing only that individual's faults and virtues, is truly one of the
casualties of racial discrimination in our society.0 1
D. Evidence of Unconscious Bias by Judges
In 1968, a group of Mexican-American activists were charged
with violating the California Criminal Code.20 2 As part of their de-
fense strategy they challenged the composition of the grand jury
that had issued the indictments, alleging that there was racial bias
in the selection of the grand jury in violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.203 During the subsequent trial, an unusual event oc-
curred.2 4 At that time, the California court system allowed judges
to select from the grand jury pool those who would actually serve
as grand jurors.20 5 In the suit brought on behalf of the Mexican-
American activists, the judges who had participated in that selec-
tion process had to respond to the allegations that they had com-
mitted acts of discrimination.2 °6 There was no factual dispute that
almost all the Mexican-Americans in the pool were passed over. °1
The critical issue was whether the conduct of the judges demon-
strated the required discriminatory intent to meet the standard es-
tablished by the Supreme Court in Washington v. Davis.2 8
200. The term institutional racism is used in a sociological sense, which is obviously
different from the accepted legal rules that define "discrimination" in their various
judicial contexts. See Crosby et al., supra note 139, at 554.
201. For a comprehensive analysis of the impact of race on the criminal justice pro-
cess, see RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW (1997).
202. Ian F. Haney Lopez, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New Theory
of Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717, 1721 (2000).
203. Id. at 1722.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1832. In Washington v. Davis, the Court distinguished between laws that
had a discriminatory impact on a protected class and those that had an adverse impact
on a protected class but were formulated with a discriminatory motive. 426 U.S. 229
(1976); Lopez, supra note 202, at 1832. It held that motive, or intent was a necessary
element in order to make out a prima facie case of an Equal Protection Clause viola-
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During the trial, more than one hundred judges testified under
oath about the criteria that they used in their selection process.2"9
While the equal protection claim was ultimately and predictably
unsuccessful, the testimony of the judges provided a unique picture
of the operation of racial bias in the judicial process. The tran-
scripts of thirty-three of the judges were reviewed by Professor Lo-
pez and revealed that when each judge was asked if their actions
were motivated by any intent to discriminate against the potential
Mexican American grand jurors, they each denied any discrimina-
tory motive.210 In stating this emphatic denial, they were probably
all aware that for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of dis-
crimination, she had to show that the discrimination was inten-
tional and not the result of non-racially motivated influences. 21' In
fact, many of the judges may have honesty believed themselves and
their process to be completely unbiased. 1 2
But despite their testimony, it is difficult to reconcile the contra-
diction between their behavior, its results, and their perception of
their conduct. Professor Lopez saw in this transcript a rare oppor-
tunity to examine the behavior of an aggregate of judges who influ-
ence the operation of the criminal justice system throughout a
county.21 3 He argued that to understand their conduct more fully,
the inherently rationalizing "intent" standard has to be ex-
amined.214 In critiquing the manner in which courts have em-
braced this rule, he explained the inherent deficiency in the
standard through a theory from the field of social psychology
called institutional analysis. 215 It:
reveals that racism occurs through the purposeful embrace of
racial institutions, but also through the non-conscious subscrip-
tion to racial background understandings and practices. In the
latter instances, explicit references to race occur infrequently; to
tion. Davis, 426 U.S. at 239; see Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977).
209. Lopez, supra note 202, at 1722.
210. Id. at 1730-47, 1757-61, 1845-76.
211. Id. at 1786.
212. More recently, an article directed to defendants in Title VII cases advised that
since the law itself focuses only on behavior, that white defendants should not be
concerned about any "private" attitudes or feelings that they have about race. Stan-
ley L. Brodsky et al., Racial Inquiries in Depositions and Trials, 26 J. PSYCHIATRY &
L. 533, 536 (1998). In fact, white defendants are advised by some authors that "one
can hold a variety of private racial attitudes and not act in a discriminatory manner."
Id.
213. Lopez, supra note 202, at 1722.
214. Id. at 1833.
215. Id. at 1723-28, 1825-44.
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the contrary, emphatic, heartfelt denials of racist motives often
accompany institutional racism. Moreover, institutional analysis
shows that remedying nonintentional racism requires openly ad-
dressing the role of racial institutions in human cognition. To
end non-conscious reliance on racial institutions requires frank
references to race; without such attention, racial institutions will
persist, unrecognized but prevalent.2 16
He further argues that some of the fault for the continuation of
this type of discrimination lies in the structure of the anti-discrimi-
nation laws themselves.217 For example, the intent standard reveals
a striking contradiction between the law's definition of discrimina-
tion as a consciously motivated act, and the well-documented so-
cial/psychological studies that reveal subtle, but significant biases
more often lie beneath the surface of these conscious acts, but are
no less determinative of behavior than if they were based on obvi-
ous logical choices. 218 The thirty-three judges in the Lopez study
were first blinded by the unconscious nature of their views on Mex-
ican-Americans, but this denial was further legitimized and rein-
forced by a legal standard that explicitly excluded any deeper
analysis. It is precisely this deeper inquiry that is essential to equip
fact-finders with the ability to see the full impact of emotional
harm that results from discrimination.
Psychological theories of cognition and behavior support the ar-
gument that as long as the culture contains innumerable elements
of racism and they are not met with a consistent and evolving
counterforce, those factors will continue to be reflected in cogni-
tive functions. 219 Until recently, there has been a distinctive disso-
216. Id. at 1838.
217. Id. at 1757-64. Professor Lopez's article is a cogent critique of the contradic-
tion between the legal standard of intent in Equal Protection cases and the uncon-
scious behavior patterns that have been documented in institutional theory. Id.
218. Id.; see Krieger, supra note 120, at 1167.
[D]isparate treatment jurisprudence-indeed the entire normative structure
of anti-discrimination law-is based on an assumption that decisionmakers
possess "transparency of mind," that they can accurately identify why they
are about to make, or have already made, a particular decision. According
to this view, if an employee's protected group status is playing a role in an
employer's decisionmaking process, the employer will be aware of that role,
even if he is not honest (or careless) enough to admit it. Equipped with
conscious self-awareness, well-intentioned employers become capable of
complying with the law's proscriptive injunction not to discriminate. They
will monitor their decisionmaking processes and prevent prohibited factors
from affecting their judgments.
Id.
219. Krieger, supra note 120, at 1174-77.
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nance between the legal structures and institutions and what is
known about human cognition, decision-making, and behavior.220
Legal rules, like the intent standard, have been premised on the
belief of a rational, knowledgeable decision-maker. In fact, this
premise of rationality is central to the operation of our legal sys-
tem. Whether one functions as judge or member of a jury, she is
assumed to be able to carefully review evidence, filter out extrane-
ous signals, including any biases, and reach rational conclusions.22'
What social science studies have demonstrated, and what many
people of color involved in the legal system have been arguing for
years, is that the filtering out of racial stereotypes and biases is
seldom as simple, logical, and direct, as a voir dire instruction to be
fair and open-minded.222 Whether this process is analyzed through
the behaviorist theories of bias,223 or more recent cognitive theo-
ries,224 or institutional analysis, 225 the results for victims of housing
discrimination and other forms of bias are the same. Without a
more open awareness and willingness to accept the passive nature
of racial bias, their actual experience and the real effects of dis-
crimination on persons of color cannot be fully accepted, under-
stood, appreciated, or valued though monitory compensation.
III. ADDRESSING EMOTIONAL HARM THROUGH LITIGATION
A. Cycles: The Persistence of Discrimination in the
Housing Market
In many ways, this Article has been discussing the effects of a
series of cycles. On a macro level, there is a cycle that begins with
segregated living patterns and the natural tendency to stereotype,
which in turn fosters prejudice, leading to discrimination and a per-
petuation of segregated living. Left unabated, the cycle is self-per-
petuating, deeply troubling, and at the root of many of society's
most persistent problems.226 At its core, this cycle is based on
ignorance.
220. Lopez, supra note 202, at 1757-64.
221. Krieger, supra note 120, at 1167.
222. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NoT SAVED 3-10 (1979); DERRICK
BELL, FACES AT THE Bol-roM OF THE WELL 1-14, 111.-14 (1992). Both these volumes
offer an extensive critique of the alleged racial neutrality of the law and the amelio-
rating effects of the application of the last forty years of our civil rights laws.
223. ALLPORT, supra note 36, at 206-18.
224. Krieger, supra note 120, at 1186-1211.
225. Lopez, supra note 202, at 1785-1806.
226. For an interesting social science overview of the impact of housing discrimina-
tion on education, employment, and poverty, see JoHiN YINGER, CLOSED DOORS, OP-
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Figure 1
Cycle of Ignorance
Discrimination Segregated
Living
Tendency to
Prejudice Stereotype
To be sure, there are many forms of ignorance, including that
peculiar variety that is racial bias. Regrettably, there are some in
society whose fear and even loathing of those different from them-
selves may never be ameliorated with more accurate information
or sustained, diverse personal contacts. It is possible, however,
that education and an awareness of important, reliable information
can cultivate understanding for a meaningful number of those who
grapple in one way or another, with the vestiges of racism. 227 That
belief leads to this inquiry and an attempt to unpack the cycles of
PORTUNITIES LOST: THE CONTINUING COSTS OF HOUSING DISCRIMINATION 135-58
(1995); see also MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 7, at 1-16 (noting the importance of
location in residential real estate as affecting prospects for property value apprecia-
tion, access to quality education and municipal services, as well as other measures of
upward mobility that are often the reward, at least for whites, for financial success).
227. See Gordon Allport's conception of racist behavior as being susceptible to
reformation through conscious social policy. See supra notes 117-125; see also Jack
Greenberg, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Confronting the Condition and
Theory, 43 B.C. L. REV. 521, 562 (2002). Professor Greenberg compares intermar-
riage rates between whites and African-Americans in the general population with the
rate among those who have served in "the armed forces, the most thoroughly inte-
grated institution in the United States." Id. The comparison is one measure of the
extent to which diverse personal contacts and more integrated living patterns lead to
significant changes in race-related behavior. Greenberg cites to a study by the noted
University of Michigan demographer, Reynolds Farley, who "found that white men
who have served in the military were three times more likely to marry black women
as white men who never served. White women who served in the military were seven
times as likely to marry black men as white women who were lifelong civilians." Id.
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ignorance that have manifested in an inability for many, to receive
full and fair compensation for the emotional injuries that flow from
housing discrimination.
The widespread persistence of segregated living patterns in our
society is self-evident to most casual observers. The work of Mas-
sey and Denton confirms in empirical terms what most objective
observers can easily gather from a drive through their
hometown.228 In an environment where one rarely has any sus-
tained contact with the "other," racial bias, drawn from the preva-
lence of negative stereotypes, often takes a strong hold.229
Prejudice in white communities and the housing discrimination
upon which it is based remains commonplace.23 ° Social science
survey evidence indicates that neighborhood preferences among
whites present a significant barrier to stable integration. A 1992
Detroit survey provides a useful illustration. The Detroit survey
found that four percent of whites would leave a neighborhood that
became seven percent African-American, fifteen percent of whites
would move if the percentage of African-American residents rose
to twenty percent, and twenty-eight percent would flee if African-
American integration reached one third.2 31 A survey performed by
NORC in 1990, indicates that the Detroit survey is representative
of national norms.232
These figures stand in sharp contrast to the survey evidence re-
garding the residential preferences of African-Americans which in-
dicates a willingness to live in multi-cultural settings. 233 The same
Detroit survey found that while most African-American respon-
dents prefer to live in a neighborhood that was at least fifty percent
African-American, nearly all would be willing to live in an inte-
grated neighborhood where the African-American population was
as low as one third.234 Perhaps even more important is evidence
from the same survey that twenty-eight percent of African-Ameri-
228. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 7, at 86, 89, 93.
229. See Maluso, supra note 29, at 72-75 (analyzing the studies on reducing bias that
have shown positive results, including cross racial interactions of persons of equal
status, the importance that the interactions be sustained, the exposure of whites to
high status African-Americans, and the addition of interracial classrooms and interra-
cial learning teams).
230. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 7, at 92.
231. Reynolds Farley, Neighborhood Preferences and Aspirations Among Blacks
and Whites, in HOUSING MARKETS AND RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY 168 (G. Thomas
Kingsley & Margery Turner eds., 1993).
232. Id. at 162.
233. Id. at 169-73.
234. Id. at 169-71.
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cans are willing to be the first to integrate a white neighborhood.235
Again, the 1990 NORC survey reflects similar results nationally. 236
Racial bias provides key players in the real estate industry such
as landlords, brokers, and lenders with an economic incentive to
discriminate. For example, typically, agents who operate in white
neighborhoods depend on white clients for business. As such, the
agent is likely to cater to the preferences of her clientele in order to
protect and promote her reputation within her client base.237 That
reputation may be significantly damaged if an agent introduces Af-
rican-American or Latino home seekers into white enclaves. Simi-
larly, such an agent's reputation could be damaged among other
brokers, potentially reducing the cooperation that is critical in the
real estate sales industry. This is a particularly powerful dynamic
in a market where increasingly, homes are sold through multiple
listing services which rely on cooperation among agents.238 Given
the ease with which housing discrimination can be disguised, strong
economic incentives often prevail over anti-discrimination statutes.
For more than forty-five years, "testing" or "auditing" has been
used as a reliable measure of discrimination. 39 Through testing,
researchers obtain direct comparisons between the treatment re-
ceived by white housing applicants as compared with the treatment
accorded to equally qualified minority applicants. 24' Testing on a
235. Id. at 171.
236. Id.
237. In the Columbia Fair Housing Clinic, clients are often unsure of where to place
responsibility for the discrimination they have suffered. Frequently, the clients' at-
tempts to secure housing brings them into contact with a wide range of actors, includ-
ing employees of the owners, brokers, and sometimes the owners themselves. In
investigating these cases as part of the litigation process, there is a great deal of fin-
ger-pointing on the part of agents who claim that they were only following the direc-
tives of their principals. The application of a strict vicarious liability standard by the
courts is, in part, a response to this phenomenon. In the ordinary course, principals
are not allowed to hide behind the actions of their agents. SCHWEMM, supra note 18,
at 12-31 to 12-32. Similarly, agents are not allowed to escape liability by claiming that
their actions were taken at the behest of their principals. Id. at 12-39; see, e.g., Jan-
kowski Lee & Assoc. v. Cisneros, 91 F.3d 891, 896-97 (7th Cir. 1996); Cabrera v.
Jakabovitz, 24 F.3d 372, 385-89 (2nd Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 876 (1994);
Green v. Century 21, 740 F.2d. 460, 462, 465 (6th Cir. 1984); Hobson v. George Hum-
phreys, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 344, 352 (W.D. Tenn. 1982).
238. See YINGER, supra note 226, at 180-81.
239. John Yinger, Testing for Discrimination in Housing and Related Markets, in A
NATIONAL REPORT CARD ON DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF TESTING
27, 28 (Michael Fix & Margory Austin Turner eds., 1999), available at http://
www.urban.org/civi/report-card.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
240. Id. In a typical fair housing test, equally qualified housing applicants, one
white and one African-American, seek the same housing accommodation at closely
timed intervals and record the results of their encounters. Id.
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broad scale in discrete housing markets can reveal the extent to
which discrimination occurs within that market. In 1977, the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"),
funded the Housing Market Practices Survey ("HMPS"), the first
national study of housing discrimination against African-Ameri-
cans.24" ' Through HMPS, 3,264 tests were conducted in forty met-
ropolitan areas revealing evidence of significant discrimination
against African-Americans in both the sales and rental markets.242
Moreover, the HMPS report is credited with playing a "major role"
in the eventual passage of the 1988 amendments to the FHA.243
In the years since the HMPS report, an impressive number of
additional studies have been performed. In the period between
1977 and 1990, at least seventy-two other testing studies were con-
ducted.244 Evidence of housing discrimination was found in all of
these studies.245
In 1989, HUD sponsored a second national testing study, the
Housing Discrimination Study ("HDS"). Through the HDS, 3,745
tests were conducted in twenty-five metropolitan areas to track the
frequency of discrimination experienced by African-Americans
and Latinos in the sales and rental markets in 1989.246 The HDS
measured a wide range of discriminatory behavior and found that
there was a fifty percent probability that both African-American
and Latino applicants would encounter some form of discrimina-
tion in both the sales and rental markets. 247 The figures indicate
that fifty-three percent of African-American renters and fifty-nine
percent of African-American home buyers will experience one or
more incidents of discrimination while looking for a home.248 Five
similar studies conducted in individual cities in the 1990s found
that, "the gross measure of discrimination in rental housing is at
least fifty percent (and as high as seventy-seven percent) against
both Blacks and Hispanics" in some areas.249 In analyzing the
HDS report, Professor John Yinger applied a form of index that
resulted in a "net measure of the average number of acts of dis-
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 32-33.
247. Id. at 34.
248. MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER ET AL., U.S. DEP'T Hous. & URBAN DEV., Hous-
ING DISCRIMINATION STUDY: SYNTHESIS 42 (1991).
249. Yinger, supra note 239, at 34.
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crimination a black or Hispanic customer can expect to encounter
during each visit to a housing agent. ' 25 ° Using this method, the
HDS report demonstrated that African-American and Latino
home buyers could expect on average, "to encounter about one act
of discrimination each time they visit a real estate broker. '251
In sum, the available evidence shows that the frequency of hous-
ing discrimination, from the HMPS report in 1977 to more recent
studies in the 1990s, has remained constant.252 The inexorable con-
clusion drawn from the available statistical evidence was stated in
A National Report Card on Discrimination in America: The Role of
Testing, issued by the Urban Institute:
Overall, this research demonstrates that black and Hispanic
home seekers continue to encounter discrimination in many as-
pects of a housing transaction. They are told about fewer availa-
ble units and must put forth considerably more effort to obtain
information and to complete a transaction. These barriers are
not absolute, but they impose significant costs on black and His-
panic home seekers relative to comparable whites in the form of
higher search costs, poorer housing outcomes, or both.25 3
This macro cycle of segregation, ignorance, and persistent dis-
crimination spins off many micro cycles of harm. As discussed ear-
lier, in one such "micro cycle" segregation leads to a lack of contact
between whites and African-Americans, which in turn spawns an
inability to see the "other" free from assumptions and negative ste-
reotypes. 25 4 This devaluation of the individual permits for some,
the rationale that allows for discriminatory treatment and a disre-
gard for the emotional harm that is its natural consequence.
Where a class of people are seen as undesirable for association or
even inferior, it is likely that they will not be treated with the same
250. Id. at 36.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 34.
253. Id. at 36. Note also that there is a growing and compelling body of evidence
that indicates widespread discrimination against minorities in mortgage approvals,
lender advertising and outreach, pre-loan application procedures and loan terms, as
well as in the provision of private mortgage insurance. YINGER, supra note 226, at 63-
85. This might lead one to assume that the courts are inundated with housing discrim-
ination cases. For a variety of reasons, however, housing discrimination is not liti-
gated at nearly the rate at which it occurs. One important factor is the ability of
perpetrators to mask their illegal acts. Many victims of differential treatment never
realize that their membership in a protected class has just barred them from securing
housing accommodations.
254. See supra note 29. For an interesting discussion of the extent to which residen-
tial segregation has resulted in a profound lack of contact between African-Ameri-
cans and whites, see Greenberg, supra note 227, at 557-59.
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respect accorded to an equal.255 This psycho-social rationale for
discriminatory conduct contributes to the persistence of illegal
behavior.
B. The Importance of Diversity in the Bench, Bar, and
Professional Support Systems: Developing the Context
for Racial Empathy
Another micro cycle that is observed is rooted in history and
demographics of the legal system. One vestige of this country's
history of legalized discrimination in housing, employment, and ed-
ucation can be seen in the demographics of fact-finders: judges and
juries. Despite some positive movement towards a more represen-
tative bench, the judiciary remains overwhelmingly white. 256 For
example, the 1991 Report of the New York State Judicial Commis-
sion on Minorities found that of the 1,129 judges sitting in the
courts of the New York, all but ninety-three are white 7.2 5  The re-
port goes on to conclude that, "[F]or nearly three hundred years,
New York State has had little or no minority representation on the
bench. 258
The dissonance between legal standards, the presumed ability of
fact-finders to filter out bias and an emerging understanding of
human cognition, behavior, and decision-making, lies at the heart
of the undervaluation of emotional harm claims. 9 While there has
been a reluctance to challenge the impartiality of judges on the
basis of race, the need to do just that is imperative to ensure the
proper functioning and integrity of the legal system. 260 Advances
in the understanding of the cognitive and behavioral underpinnings
of decision-making and a growing body of empirical study on how
race can produce differences in perceptions on a wide range of is-
255. See, e.g., Crosby et al., supra note 139, at 546; Peggy C. Davis, Law As
Microagression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559, 1561-69 (1989).
256. Demographics gathered with respect to the federal judiciary, for example, re-
veal the following statistics as of July 13, 2000. Of the 792 active judges: "82.7% white
(655), 10.7% African-American (85), 5.2% Hispanic (41), 0.9% Asian-American (7),
0.3% Native-American (2), and .1% Arab-American (1)." Alliance for Justice, Demo-
graphic Portrait of the Federal Judiciary (2000), at http://web.archive.org/web/
20010208193600/http://www.afj.org/jsp/pfjjan.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
257. 4 REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE JUDICIAL COMMISSION ON MINORITIES,
LEGAL PROFESSION, NONJUDICIAL OFFICERS, EMPLOYEES AND MINORITY CONTRAC-
TORS 94 (1991). Of the ninety-three "non-white" judges, only seventy-one are Afri-
can-American. Id.
258. Id.
259. See supra notes 219-225.
260. Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and Pub-
lic Confidence, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 405, 405 (2000).
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sues can foster an ability to approach the issue in a less judgmental
fashion.2 1 As one commentator observed:
The existence of a persistent racial divide between the response
of African Americans and whites to important social, economic,
political, and cultural issues evidences the enduring power of ra-
cial constructs. In countless surveys, African Americans and
whites reveal sharply different perspectives, particularly in re-
sponse to issues that explicitly refer to race. For example, blacks
and whites disagree about the meaning and power of discrimina-
tion. Because many issues not explicitly racial in nature carry a
racial sub-text, African Americans and whites also express dif-
ferent views about ostensibly nonracial issues such as increasing
aid for social programs, downsizing of the federal government,
raising taxes, and giving control of welfare to the states.2 62
These differences in perspective often play an active and varied
role in valuing emotional harm. Consider that, in New York, com-
pensation for emotional harm may be awarded upon proof of the
existence and extent of such harm, and evidence that supports a
determination that "a reasonable person of average sensibilities
could be fairly expected to suffer mental anguish from the inci-
dent.' '263 In bench trials, that can occur in trial courts and in all
hearings before administrative agencies, who is the "reasonable
person of average sensibilities?" Given the demographics of the
judiciary, far more often than not, that "reasonable person" is
someone whose sensibilities have not been affected by experiences
of discrimination and the trauma that is the norm, by medical stan-
dards. This does not make fair valuation impossible, but cannot be
seen as enhancing the possibility of a knowledgeable assessment.264
The "reasonable person" standard, in this context, is an attempt
to impose an "objective" perspective on what should be a fact-spe-
cific evaluation of harm as it is experienced by each plaintiff within
the context of that plaintiff's life. 265 Even when "objective" stan-
dards are not formally employed, the very nature of the legal doc-
261. Id. at 424-31.
262. Id. at 424-25. It is, of course, important to disclaim any suggestion that all
members of any group share the same opinions. The point, however, is that because
of the history and continuing power of racism in the United States, the experiences of
whites and African-Americans are often quite different and those experiences can
affect perceptions.
263. Batavia Lodge No. 196 v. N.Y. State Div. of Human Rights, 350 N.Y.S. 273,
278 (App. Div. 1973), modified on other grounds, 316 N.E.2d 318 (N.Y. 1974).
264. Schwemm, supra note 22, at 93.
265. SCHWEMM, supra note 18, at 25-37 to 25-40; see Heifetz & Heinz, supra note
75. at 18-21.
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trine that applies to evaluations of emotional harm leaves ample
room for judicial miscalculation regarding the proper weight that
should be accorded to the evidence. This can occur through a lack
of sensitivity, inexperience, bias (unconscious or not), or through a
substitution, however subtle, of the judge's reaction to the discrimi-
natory behavior for the actual proof adduced at trial regarding the
plaintiff's reaction.266
Generally, judges in bench trials and at administrative agencies,
like juries, have enormous discretion in determining the size of
damage awards for intangible injuries such as emotional harm. 267
As a matter of course, the fact-finder's decision regarding the
amount of the award will survive appellate review unless it is
clearly erroneous.268
Trial judges have been repeatedly admonished to articulate the
bases for the awards they make.269  Adherence to this practice,
however, seems more the exception than the rule. 270 This, in part,
has led to great uncertainty in predicting the valuation of emo-
tional harm and to wide variations in precedent.27'
266. Ifill, supra note 260, at 417. In the words of Professor Ifill:
The intuitive sense that minority judges can bring traditionally excluded per-
spectives to the process of legal decision-making is consistent with the prom-
inent role race plays in shaping the perspectives and values of blacks and
whites. I deliberately speak here of both perspectives and values. Perspec-
tives might be defined as "ways of looking at the world" or the eyes through
which blacks "see" and "interpret" events, symbols, or people. Because per-
ception is the lens through which judges make decisions, the inclusion of
multiple perspectives in judicial decision-making is a critical focus of diver-
sity. Values are also critical to judicial decision-making. Values are the rules
or standards by which a community, based on its perceptions, organizes and
assigns worth. Values reflect "an enduring belief that a specific mode of
conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable." Val-
ues are the principles which undergird our laws and legal doctrine. Judges
interpret law based on their perception of our core societal values. Both
perspective and values can strongly influence legal decision-making.
Id.
267. SCHWEMM, supra note 18, at 25-43.
268. Id.; see FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
269. See N.Y. City Transit Auth. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 577 N.E.2d 40, 47
(N.Y. 1991); see also Heifetz & Heinz, supra note 75, at 7-8 (reminding readers that
litigants before HUD have the right, pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act,
to "hear why the judge rendered a particular decision.").
270. See Heifetz & Heinz, supra note 75, at 7 (recalling a "history of cases (in dis-
trict courts) with no apparent nexus between evidence of actual injury and the award
of damages to the complainant, and a paucity of published opinions explaining the
basis for the awards [in housing discrimination cases].").
271. SCHWEMM, supra note 18, at 25-34 to 25-35 ("Predicting the value of an indi-
vidual case is virtually impossible.").
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In addition to assessing the nature of the plaintiff's reaction to
discrimination, there are at least two other major areas of judicial
review in housing discrimination cases that are susceptible to the
same kinds of miscalculations stemming from bias, a lack of appli-
cable life experience, training, or sensitivity. The first involves is-
sues of credibility that are so crucial in the valuation of emotional
harm injuries. In the words of Alan W. Heifetz, the Chief Admin-
istrative Law Judge ("AL") at HUD, "[w]ithout doubt, the most
important factor in determining a damage award for intangible in-
juries is the testimony of the victim. ' 272 Judges and juries are the
chief "finders of fact" in our system of justice. 273 Assessments of
credibility are at the heart of what judges do to determine what is
or is not true, what did or did not happen. Perception is the lens
through which judges make decisions.274 Judges face the same
challenges as everyone else in our society, when attempting to ap-
propriately invoke their life experience and perspective in making
decisions.275 As expressed by Judge Jerome Frank, "[m]uch harm
is done by the myth that, merely by putting on a black robe and
taking the oath of office as a judge, a man ceases to be human and
strips himself of all predilections, becomes a passionless thinking
machine. 2 76 Race, in turn, influences perceptions and judges'
sense of justice. 7 Such racial "cognitive drifts" among judges may
affect critical decisions including the credibility of an African-
American witness or the worth of an African-American expert,
both of which can adversely affect the valuation of emotional harm
damages occasioned by African-American victims of housing
discrimination.7y
The second area of judicial fact interpretation that can greatly
influence valuation outcomes involves an assessment of the egre-
giousness of the defendant's behavior. Professor Schwemm has de-
tailed the enormous importance of a finding that the discriminatory
acts were willful and, therefore, more likely to cause more severe
emotional harm.279 Questions of intent or willfulness are also
within the purview of perceptions that can be affected by racialized
272. Heifetz & Heinz, supra note 75, at 19.
273. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
274. Ifill, supra note 260, at 417.
275. Id. at 432.
276. In re J.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 652-53 (2d Cir. 1943)
277. Ifill, supra note 260, at 434.
278. Id. at 445; See Davis, supra note 255, at 1571.
279. SCHWEMM, supra note 18, at 25-37.
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experience.28 ° Indeed, there is support for the belief that in our
society, with its deep racial divisions, the interpretation of "narra-
tives," as may be contained in the testimony of a defendant in a
housing discrimination case for example, are suspect. The suspi-
cion stems from the reality that narratives can be adopted or re-
jected when viewed through the lens of preconceived ideas, even in
the face of evidence or logic to the contrary. 8 The skewed
demographics of the judiciary invoke concern that imbalances in
perception of the kind outlined above may play a role in the under-
valuation of damage awards.
The dissonance between racialized differences in perspective and
judicial demographics may find expression in other features of judi-
cial action that dampen the capacity to secure awards that are more
in line with the emotional distress that is credibly experienced by
many victims of housing discrimination. One such phenomenon is
the appearance of an artificial ceiling on damage awards in certain
jurisdictions. Professor Schwemm notes the emergence of a
$10,000 per plaintiff upward benchmark in emotional distress
awards in the Seventh Circuit that stands in contrast to outcomes in
other circuits. 282
Similarly, the Court of Appeals in New York, in an opinion by
the Honorable Judith Kaye, who went on to become the current
Chief Judge, found it necessary to admonish the Second Depart-
ment for arbitrarily reducing a $450,000 award for mental anguish
and aggravation in an employment discrimination suit, to
$75,000.283 In a rare display of disapproval that, by implication,
extended beyond the parameters of the case on appeal, the court
cautioned the justices serving on the Second Department bench
not to routinely substitute their own abstract notions of an upward
limit on emotional harm awards for well supported findings of trial
courts.284 More specifically, the court reversed a decision by the
280. For a useful introduction to the various critiques of the intent standard, see
Ifill, supra note 260, at 450 n.214.
281. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
1060, 1085 (1991).
282. SciiwEMM, supra note 18, at 25-40 to 25-42.
283. N.Y. City Transit Auth. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 577 N.E.2d 40, 47
(N.Y. 1991).
284. Id. at 217-19. Amici, including the Women's Legal Defense Fund, argued that
the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department has a practice
of substituting their own judgment for that of the trial judge. Id. at 209. A large
number of Second Department cases were cited where trial court awards were re-
duced to a top amount of $5,000. Id. at 218-19. There is little doubt that this practice
caught the attention of the Court of Appeals and precipitated reference to the conten-
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Second Department that a maximum of $75,000 would adequately
compensate the plaintiff for what the trial ALJ described as, "the
most shocking instance of abuse of an employee by an
employer. "285
Another feature of judicial action that may serve to depress
awards can be seen in the different approaches taken by various
circuit courts in the application of the "eggshell skull" or "thin
skull" doctrine in cases involving psychological trauma. In the or-
dinary course, tortfeasors, such as the defendants in a housing dis-
crimination matter, "take their victims as they find them. ' 286 This
doctrine requires defendants to compensate plaintiffs for unfore-
seeable psychic injury flowing from preexisting conditions or
heightened sensitivity to discrimination. 287 As HUD's Chief ALJ
expressed the doctrine:
Housing discriminators must take their victims as they find
them; that is, damages are measured based on the injuries actu-
ally suffered by the victim, not on the injuries that would have
been suffered by a reasonable or by an ordinary person. Put
otherwise, judges must take into consideration the susceptibility
of the victim to injury. This rule can work either to the respon-
dent's financial advantage or disadvantage.288
tions of the amici. Id. at 219. The cases submitted to support the claim of a $5,000
ceiling were: Empbanque Capital Corp. v White, 551 N.Y.S.2d 957, 958 (App. Div.
1990); Grumman Aerospace Corp. v. N.Y. State Div. of Human Rights, 542 N.Y.S.2d
681, 682 (App. Div. 1989); Cosmos Forms, Ltd. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 541
N.Y.S.2d 50, 51 (App. Div. 1989); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. N.Y. Executive Dep't,
537 N.Y.S.2d 868, 869-70 (App. Div. 1989); Arthur Kessler Realty, Inc. v. N.Y. State
Div. of Human Rights, 524 N.Y.S.2d 732, 733 (App. Div. 1988); State Univ. Agric. &
Technical Coll. at Farmingdale v. State Div. of Human Rights, 520 N.Y.S.2d 814, 815
(App. Div. 1987); Wantagh Union Free Sch. Dist. v. N.Y. State Div. of Human
Rights, 505 N.Y.S.2d 713, 715 (App. Div. 1986); Matter of Anchor Motor Freight,
Inc., 500 N.Y.S.2d 800, 801 (App. Div. 1986).
285. Id. at 210. Of significance is that the Second Department sits in judgment over
a disproportionately large portion of New York. The Historical Society of the Courts
of the State of New York, The History of the Court, Appellate Division, Second De-
partment, 100th Anniversary (1996), at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/history/
elecbook/2ddept/pg4.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2003). As of 1996, more than one-half
of the population of the State resides in the Second Department and approximately
forty-two percent of intermediate appellate cases were handled by the court. Id. The
ten counties within the Second Department are: Kings, Queens, Richmond, Nassau,
Suffolk, Westchester, Putnam, Dutchess, Rockland, and Orange Counties. Id.
286. JOHN P. RELMAN, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION PRACTICE MANUAL 6-12 (2001).
287. Id.
288. Heifetz & Heinz, supra note 75, at 21-22; In Davis v. Mansards, a married
couple had been the victim of housing discrimination. 597 F. Supp. 334, 347-48 (N.D.
Ind. 1984). The court awarded $5,000 to the wife who had been, "deci-
mated.. .emotionally," but only $2,500 to the husband who approached the situation
with a "degree of cynicism" and was consequently, "steadied for the blow" even
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This rule, which applies to both preexisting physical and psycho-
logical conditions, has been followed in the Seventh Circuit.28 9 In
the Second Circuit, however, victims of housing discrimination may
not recover for preexisting psychic trauma.290 In a culture where
racism is common, the refusal to award harm in proportion to the
actual damage inflicted, in effect, insulates discriminators from the
proper level of economic exposure for their actions. In so doing, it
flies in the face of the stated purpose of fair housing laws.
Coming at the point directly, there is one empirical study that
specifically links race to judicial outcomes in discrimination cases.
The study, The Effects of Judges' Decision Making on the U.S.
Courts of Appeal 1981-96, tracked case outcomes in the federal
court.29 ' Among its findings are the following:
(1) black federal judges regardless of political party affiliation
decide cases in favor of plaintiffs in race discrimination cases at
statistically significantly higher levels than white male and fe-
male judges; and that (2) black federal judges are more likely
than even white female judges to decide cases in favor of plain-
tiffs in sex discrimination cases.292
The data from the study further reveals that an appellate panel
of three white Republican judges is likely to find in favor of the
plaintiff in a discrimination case only ten percent of the time. 93
The likelihood of drawing an appellate panel with even one Afri-
can-American judge is only twenty-percent. 94 Based on these
findings, Professor Crowe, the study's author, concludes that if
"'the number of blacks and whites on Appellate Court[s] reflected
their proportion in the nation,' . . . it would 'make a difference in
how race discrimination cases [would] ... be decided.'" 295
The study appears to directly suggest that the lack of full racial
diversity on federal appellate courts both determines the immedi-
ate outcome of discrimination cases and, in so doing, has played a
"though he suffered through his wife's depression while sustaining his own reopened
wounds." Id.
289. See, e.g., Avitia v. Metro. Club of Chi., Inc., 49 F.3d 1219, 1228 (7th Cir. 1995);
Brackett v. Peters, 11 F.3d 78, 81 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1072 (1994);
Williamson v. Handy Button Mach. Co., 817 F.2d 1290, 1294 (7th Cir. 1987).
290. Ragin v. Harry Macklowe Real Estate Co., 6 F.3d 898, 908 (2d Cir. 1993).
291. Ifill, supra note 260, at 454 n.234.
292. Id. at 454.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. (quoting Nancy Crowe, The Effects of Judges' Sex and Race on Decision
Making on the U.S. Courts of Appeal, 1981-96 (1999) (unpublished Ph.D. disserta-
tion, University of Chicago) (on file with the author)).
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role in the development of federal anti-discrimination law.296 Ac-
cording to Professor Ifill, "[t]he empirical work of Professor Crowe
supports the weight of anecdotal evidence which suggests that Afri-
can American and white judges see racial bias differently. At the
very least, Professor Crowe's work demonstrates the potential im-
portance of judicial diversity to affect judicial case outcomes. "297
As is the case with the judiciary, the juries which often sit in
judgment on housing discrimination cases are composed primarily
of whites. 298 Here again the situation in New York is instructive.
The Report of the New York State Judicial Commission on Minori-
ties reveals that, "[m]inorities are significantly underrepresented on
many juries in the court system. '299 The report further finds that:
while displays of blatant racism are not common in today's
courtrooms, jurors' racist attitudes, whether or not they are ac-
tually uttered aloud, frequently determine the outcome of cases
involving minority defendants. Studies also show that hidden
racial prejudices can distort a juror's perception of the evidence
and events at trial.300
Certainly, the presence of an all or predominantly white jury
does not preclude fairness or an informed evaluation of emotional
harm. The lack of racial diversity in juries, however, results in a
situation whereby those responsible for valuing the trauma exper-
ienced by victims of discrimination are often not equipped with a
knowledge base, gained through personal experience or sustained
relationships with those outside the dominant culture, sufficient to
accurately assess plaintiffs' claims.30'
296. Id.
297. Id. at 454-55.
298. See, e.g., THEODORE EISENBERG & MARTIN T. WELLS, TRIAL OUTCOMES AND
DEMOGRAPHICS: Is THERE A BRONX EFFECT? 12 (2002) (indicating eleven percent of
federal juries and twelve percent of state juries are comprised of African-Americans),
available at www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/clcjm/civiljustice/Eisenberg.pdf
(last visited Mar. 15, 2003). Note that the statistics are based on a sample, albeit a
large sample, of juries. Id. at I n.1.
299. 2 REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION ON MINORITIES, THE PUB-
LIC AND THE COURTS 58 (1991).
300. Id. at 57.
301. See Ragin v. N.Y. Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 1005 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting that the
process whereby awards for emotional harm are calculated requires "wholly specula-
tive judgments as to credibility."). Speculation of this type necessarily implicates our
internal propensity to rely on stereotypes in forming factual conclusions. See Davis,
supra note 255, at 1566-67. There is strong speculation among trial lawyers concern-
ing the relationship between juror demographics and trial outcomes. See EISENBERG
& WELLS, supra note 298, at 2. Moreover, a review of housing discrimination cases
involving claims of emotional harm reveals anecdotal evidence indicating that many
of the higher awards occur in jurisdictions with higher concentrations of people of
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History and demographics also contribute to a cycle that makes
it difficult for those who suffer from the emotional harm caused by
housing discrimination to receive assistance and support from the
two professions that are in the best position to provide relief: the
legal and medical professions. Here again, the racism that has con-
strained the life choices of people of color manifests itself in the
demographics of lawyers and doctors.
A useful landmark for a discussion about the under-representa-
tion of minorities in the both the legal and medical professions gen-
erally is the demographics of the United States population. As a
point of reference, the minority group population, according to the
1980 census, was twenty percent.30 2 By 2000, whites comprised
only 69.1 percent of the population. 30 3 This trend towards greater
color. One such example can be found by comparing the judges' responses to emo-
tional harm claims in Portee and Broome. See discussion supra note 97. There are,
however, no known surveys that claim to correlate damage awards for emotional
harm with the demographics of the fact finders. Indeed, empirical studies seeking a
correlation between trial outcomes generally and demographics are rare. The most
recent and statistically comprehensive such study, known to the Authors, Trial Out-
comes and Demographics: Is there a Bronx Effect?, concludes that in federal jury tri-
als, "We do find a significant correlation between larger black population percents
and the likelihood of a plaintiff trial win in urban job discrimination, products liabil-
ity, and torts cases." EISENBERG & WELLS, supra note 298, at 1. At the same time,
the study concludes that, "[i]n federal court trials, we find no robust evidence that
award levels in cases won by plaintiffs correlate with population demographics in the
expected direction." Id. The study concedes that:
there are limits to what the available data can reveal. The data do not in-
clude the makeup of juries in individual cases. Therefore, evidence about
demographic influences on juror behavior is indirect .... Nor can the data
test perceptions based on the interaction between plaintiff and defendant
characteristics. For example, these data cannot directly test whether white
jurors are hostile to black plaintiffs, and vice versa, because the data do not
include the parties' race.
Id. at 9.
302. KENT D. LOLLIS & ROBERT D. CARR, LAW SCH. ADMISSIONS COUNCIL, MI-
NORITY DATABOOK t (2002).
303. U.S. Census Bureau, Quick Table, DP-l. Profile of General Demographic
Characteristics: 2000 (2000), at http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/QTTable?ds-
name=DEC_2000_SFIU&geo-id=0OOOUS&qr..name=DEC_2000_SF1_UDP1
(last visited Mar. 15, 2003). In 2000, there were 194,552,774 people who were identi-
fied as "white alone" and this figure represented 69.1 percent of the total population.
Id. The manner in which racial categories are defined by the Census Bureau is inter-
esting. According to the Bureau:
The data on race were derived from answers to the question on race that was
asked of all people. The concept of race, as used by the Census Bureau,
reflects self-identification by people according to the race or races with
which they most closely identify. These categories are sociopolitical con-
structs and should not be interpreted as being scientific or anthropological in
nature. Furthermore, the race categories include both racial and national-
origin groups.
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diversity will significantly increase in the coming years.30 4 Credible
estimates project that whites will no longer be in the majority by
mid-century.30 5 It is against this backdrop, that the demographics
of lawyers and doctors should be considered.
By early 1988, the population of lawyers in the U.S. had grown
to nearly 750,000.306 At that time, when African-Americans, Lati-
nos, Native Americans, and Asian Americans accounted for nearly
twenty-five percent of the United States population, that same
group accounted for only eight percent of this country's attor-
neys.3 °7 Current statistics indicate slightly more diversity within
the legal profession, but also some disturbing omens of retrench-
ment and continued under-representation. The American Bar As-
sociation's Commission on Racial and Ethnic Diversity in the
Profession 30 concludes that as of 2000, "minority representation in
the legal profession is significantly lower than in most other profes-
sions. ' '3° The report adds that, "minority entry into the profession
U.S. Census Bureau, Census Data Information, Subject Characteristic, at http://fact
finder.census.gov/servlet/MetadataBrowserServlet?type=subject&id=RACESF1&
dsspName=DEC_2000_SF1&back=update&jlang=EN (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
The Census Bureau used "Revisions to the Standards for the Classification of Federal
Data on Race and Ethnicity," a Federal Register Notice, published by the Office of
Management and Budget. Id. "White" is defined as, "A person having origins in any
of the original peoples of Europe, the Middle East, or North Africa." Id. "It includes
people who indicate their race as 'White' or report entries such as Irish, German,
Italian, Lebanese, Near Easterner, Arab, or Polish." Id.
304. LoLLIs & CARR, supra note 302, at 1.
305. U.S. Census Bureau, Projections of the Resident Population by Race, Hispanic
Origin, and Nativity: Middle Series, 2050 to 2070 (2000), at http://www.census.gov/
population/projections/nation/summary/np-t5-g.txt (last visited Mar. 15, 2003). The
Census Bureau provides population projections across many variants. For our pur-
poses, these projections are done based on a lowest, middle, and highest series, with
the "lowest" representing the minimum projection that can be expected using their
methodology. Using the Bureau's "Middle Series" projections, the "White, Non-His-
panic" population will fall below fifty percent, to 49.6 percent by July 1, 2060. Id. The
ABA's Commission on Racial and Ethnic Diversity in the Profession predicts that the
United States population will be "almost 60 percent 'minority' by 2050." COMM'N ON
RACIAL & ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN THE PROFESSION, AM. BAR ASS'N, EXECUTIVE SUM-
MARY, MILES To Go: THE PROGRESS OF MINORITIES IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION, at
http://www.abanet.org/minorities/publications/milesummary.html (last visited Mar.
15, 2003).
306. GEOFFREY C. HAZZARD, JR. & DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE LEGAL PROFES-
SION: RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION, 48-55 (3d ed. 1994).
307. Id. at 68.
308. This body was known as the Commission on Opportunities for Minorities in
the Profession.
309. COMM'N ON RACIAL & ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN THE PROFESSION, supra note
305.
Combined African American and Hispanic representation among lawyers
was seven percent in 1998, compared to 14.3 percent among accountants, 9.7
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has slowed considerably since 1995. '' 3 11 Moreover, "in 1999, the
total number of minority law graduates in the United States
dropped for the first time since 1985. ' 311
It should not be surprising that it can be difficult for lawyers who
have not experienced the pain caused by discrimination to under-
stand, appreciate, value, and pursue substantial emotional harm
awards.31 2 This is particularly important in that:
Attorneys ... are frequently the first, and sometimes the only
persons to whom the victim pours out the full story of his or her
experience. The attorney's.., verbal and non-verbal responses
during the interviews with the victim can either aggravate or al-
leviate some of the pain and anguish suffered by the victim. 31 3
Many advocates who seek to properly present a record in sup-
port of a meaningful award of emotional harm damages lack the
requisite personal and professional experience. 31 4 The few scholars
and jurists who have written on this subject commonly stress the
importance of creating an extensive factual record regarding the
manifestations and extent of the harm suffered.315 This requires
the advocate to fully appreciate the varied and often subtle symp-
toms of discrimination-based trauma that the client might manifest
and to have the facility to both elicit and present what is often very
personal information in a caring and persuasive manner. Experi-
ence and training are typically required, regardless of the personal
characteristics of the advocate.3 16 Differences in race, age, and
percent among physicians, 9.4 percent among college and university teach-
ers, and 7.9 percent among engineers. The only professions with lower levels
of minority representation were dentists (4.8 percent) and natural scientists
(6.9 percent).
Id.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. See Davis, supra note 255, at 1561-64; Lawrence, supra note 115, at 519, 525-
26.
313. Michael P. Seng et al., Counseling a Victim of Racial Discrimination in a Fair
Housing Case, 26 J. MARSHA-LL L. REv. 53, 54-55 (1992).
314. Id.
315. Heifetz & Heinz, supra note 75, at 19-21.
316. Id. The authors nicely articulate the challenge as follows:
Most attorneys and advocates who counsel the victims of housing discrimi-
nation are committed to the cause of fair housing and are sensitive to their
client's injuries. Nonetheless, they may fail to pick up on the real hurt and
trauma the client experiences during the interview. Because of the necessity
to channel the client's complaint into the forms specified in the fair housing
laws, the attorney or advocate may miss developing some of the unique inju-
ries suffered by the victim. This failure may seriously affect the outcome of
the complaint and it may further scar the victim.
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gender can sometimes inhibit a candid exchange of information be-
tween attorney and client. Beyond that lies the propensity for at-
torneys to focus only on "objective" facts, or presume an
understanding by the tribunal of the inherent pain associated with
discrimination.3 17
In the medical profession, the demographics reveal even less di-
versity. The best available statistics from the American Medical
Association indicate that in 2001, there were 836,156 physicians in
the United States.318 Of that total, only 2.5 percent are African-
American.319 The American Psychiatric Association, in its Position
Statement on Diversity, acknowledged that, "despite efforts to in-
crease cultural diversity among psychiatrists, data from the AAMC
and other sources indicate the continued serious under-representa-
tion of certain ethnic minority groups among U.S. medical stu-
dents, medical school facilities and departments of psychiatry and
practicing clinicians. '3 0 As this Article shall discuss below, these
discouraging demographics, combined with inadequate training in
the housing discrimination context make it difficult to find psychi-
atric professionals who have the training and expertise necessary to
recognize the wide range of psychological and physiological symp-
toms associated with the emotional harm that flow from housing
discrimination. A review of how we became aware of this problem
is illustrative.
When the Fair Housing Clinic began operation in 1989, most of
the cases were lodged at the New York City Commission on
Human Rights ("the Commission"). At that time, the Commission
was the place where many, if not most, New Yorkers went to pur-
Id. at 55.
317. Seng et al., supra note 313, at 55.
318. AM. MEDICAL ASS'N, TOTAL PHYSICIANS By RACE/ETFNICITY-2001 (2001),
at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/article/168-187.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
319. Id. Note, however, that the 2001 year-end statistics gathered by the AMA
contained race/ethnicity data for about three-fourths of all physicians in the United
States. Id. The AMA does not, at this time, know the race/ethnicity of thirty-one
percent of the physicians in the United States despite efforts to obtain better statistics.
Id. The AMA estimates that this leads to some underreporting in the number of
"minority" categories. Id.
320. See Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, Position Statement on Diversity (Sept. 12, 1998), at
http://www.psych.org/pract-of psych/diversity_98.cfm (last visited Mar. 15, 2003). In-
deed, the "Position Statement" went on to note disparities in the treatment of minor-
ity patients indicating that, "[s]ome ethnic minority clinicians have been found to treat
ethnic minority and socioeconomically impoverished population." Id.
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sue discrimination cases on a pro se basis.32' The Commission
awards for emotional harm in housing discrimination cases were
quite modest. 322 Cases lodged at the Commission were tried by a
small cadre of administrative law judges. We thought that if we
could influence that small group of judges by providing expert tes-
timony on issues related to emotional harm, then we could better
represent our clients, provide a service to the Commission, and
benefit those pro se complainants that we could not directly assist.
We set out to identify a group of psychiatrists who would serve,
for compensation, as experts on behalf of our clients. Our students
scoured the psychological literature in an attempt to discover the
names of leaders in what we naively imagined was a "field" dedi-
cated to the study of race-based trauma. In so doing, we discov-
ered a few surprising phenomena. First, there is very little
scholarly writing on the race-based harm suffered by victims of
housing discrimination.323 Second, there are very few experts on
the topic and a dearth of empirical research in this area.324 Nar-
rowing the search became less of a problem than finding profes-
sionals with adequate training or interest in the traumatic effects of
housing discrimination. In the end, only a few psychiatrists who
321. Michael H. Schill, Local Enforcement of Laws Prohibiting Discrimination in
Housing: The New York City Human Rights Commission, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 991,
1020 (1996).
322. See, e.g., Holley v. Koscielna, Recommended Decision and Order, Amended
Complaint No. FN36020190DN at 17, New York City Commission of Human Rights
(1991) (awarding $2,000 to each complainant).
In instances where mental anguish has been sufficiently demonstrated by
credible evidence, this Commission will award compensation in the form of a
monetary award. See Tindull v. Ko, Rec. Decision and Order, NYCCHR
Compl. No. FH304082489-DN (February 25, 1991), affd, Decision and Or-
der (June 25, 1991) ($1,000 mental anguish award ); Carrera v. Pi, Rec. Deci-
sion and Order NYCCHR Compl. No. FN264092288-DN (February 25,
1991), affd Decision and Order (June 24, 1991) ($1,000 mental anguish).
Id. at 14.
323. See Broome v. Biondi, 17 F. Supp. 2d 211, 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("Relatively
little in-depth research exists concerning the personal costs of discrimination and ra-
cial exclusion."). Valuable general references have been made by Professor
Schwemm in several of his writings. See, e.g., Kentucky Commission on Human
Rights, supra note 56, at 76-79; Schwemm, supra note 22, at 91-93. Most of these
discussions concern emotional harm generally and do not focus on particular aspects
of the issue that might be unique to the experience of people of color. Id. at 93-94.
324. See, e.g., David R. Williams et al., Race, Stress, and Physical Health: The Role
of Group Identity, in SELF, SOCIAL IDENTITY, AND PHYSICAL HEALTH: INTERDISCI-
PLINARY ExPLORATIONs 71, 94-96 (Richard J. Contrada & Richard D. Ashmore eds.,
1999) (noting the dearth of research on the impact of discrimination on the health of
African-Americans).
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had acquired expertise in treating victims of discrimination were
located.
Ultimately, we began working with Dr. Hugh F. Butts, a promi-
nent psychiatrist with over thirty years experience in treating vic-
tims of discrimination.325 Through our work with Dr. Butts, we
learned that there is no formal training in medical school that
would introduce medical students to an understanding of race-
based trauma.326 Indeed, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
325. After graduation from Meharry Medical College in 1953, Dr. Butts did an
internship and then a Psychiatric residency at the Bronx Veteran's Adminis-
tration Hospital. He completed his psychoanalytic training at the Columbia
University Center for Psychoanalytic training and research in 1961, and was
appointed a Supervising and training Psychoanalyst in 1967. Concurrently,
he was appointed an Assistant Professor of Psychiatry at the Columbia Uni-
versity College of Physicians and Surgeons. Between 1962 and 1969 he was
the Chief of the Psychiatric Inpatient service and Associate Director of Psy-
chiatry at Harlem Hospital Center. From 1974 to 1979 he was the Director
of Bronx State Hospital with a one-year interruption (1975 to 1976) to serve
as the First Deputy Commissioner of the New York State Department of
Metal Hygiene. From 1974 to 1981 he was a full Professor of Psychiatry at
the Albert Einstein College of Medicine, and from 1982 to 1986 has been
Visiting Professor of Psychiatry at Meharry Medical College, Nashville,
Tennessee.
BuTTs, supra note 25.
326. See States Begin to Mandate Standards For Culturally Competent Services, Psy-
CHIATRIC NEWS, Jul. 7, 2000, available at http://www.psych.org/pnews/00-07-07/
states.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2003); see also ELENA COHEN & TAWARA D. GOODE,
NATIONAL CTR. FOR CULTURAL COMPETENCE, POLICY BRIEF 1, RATIONALE FOR
CULTURAL COMPETENCE IN PRIMARY HEALTH CARE (1999), available at http://
www.georgetown.edu/research/gucdc/nccc/nccc6.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
Among the findings are the following:
Nationally, health care organizations and programs are struggling with the
challenges and opportunities to respond effectively to the needs of individu-
als and families from racially, ethnically, culturally and linguistically diverse
groups. The incorporation of culturally competent approaches within pri-
mary health care systems remains a great challenge for many states and com-
munities. Despite similarities, fundamental differences among people arise
from nationality, ethnicity and culture, as well as from family background
and individual experience. These differences affect the health beliefs and
behaviors of both patients and providers have of each other. The delivery of
high-quality primary health care that is accessible, effective and cost efficient
requires health care practitioners to have a deeper understanding of the
socio-cultural background of patients, their families and the environments in
which they live. Culturally competent primary health services facilitate
clinical encounters with more favorable outcomes, enhance the potential for
a more rewarding interpersonal experience and increase the satisfaction the
individual receiving health care services. Critical factors in the provision of
culturally competent health care services include understanding of the:
" beliefs, values, traditions and practices of a culture;
" culturally-defined, health-related needs of individuals, families and
communities;
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Mental Disorders ("DSM-IV"), which catalogs the variety of
mental disorders, and which is the most widely used measure of
both the typology and severity of psychological injury, does not
contain any description of racism, prejudice, discrimination, or any
discussion of the impact that those forces might have on the human
psyche.327
When one considers the extent to which racism has a strong and
continuing influence on the daily lives of so many, it is remarkable
that the medical professionals who specialize in healing the human
psyche often lack the training and personal experience necessary
for proper diagnosis and treatment. 32 Dr. Butts, has described the
prescription for this diversity deficit as follows:
" culturally-based belief systems of the etiology of illness and disease and
those related to health and healing; and
* attitudes toward seeking help from health care providers.
In making a diagnosis, health care providers must understand the beliefs that
shape a person's approach to health and illness. Knowledge of customs and
healing traditions are indispensable to the design of treatment and interven-
tions. Health care services must be received and accepted to be successful.
Increasingly, cultural knowledge and understanding are important to person-
nel responsible for quality assurance programs. In addition, those who de-
sign evaluation methodologies for continual program improvement must
address hard questions about the relevance of health care interventions.
Cultural competence will have to be inextricably linked to the definition of
specific health outcomes and to an ongoing system of accountability that is
committed to reducing the current health disparities among racial, ethnic
and cultural populations.
Id.; see, e.g., James H. Carter, Racism's Impact on Mental Health, 86 J. NAT'L MEDI-
CAL Ass'N 543, 544-46 (1994). The author points out that as recently as 1969, the
American Psychiatric Association ("APA") discriminated against its African-Ameri-
can members. Id. at 544-45. In 1972, the APA acknowledged that the racial attitudes
of APA members would have to change in order for its members to adequately treat
non-white patients. Id. at 545. By 1978, the APA recognized that culture could be a
critical element in diagnosing and treating mental disorders, and that "psychiatric
literature was replete with misconceptions, inaccuracies, and stereotypes of African-
American behavior." Id. Despite this resolution from the Task Force, however, resis-
tance by many white psychiatrists continued and misdiagnosis and mistreatment con-
tinue to be issues of concern. Id. at 545-46; see Maluso, supra note 29, at 56 (citing
studies that found that African-Americans were less likely to be seen by psychologists
or psychiatrists and more likely than whites to be seen by para-professionals). Studies
also found that "Blacks were hospitalized for fewer days than Whites, had fewer inpa-
tient privileges than Whites, were less likely to receive occupational and recreational
therapy that Whites, were restrained and secluded significantly more often than were
Whites, and were medicated twice as many days as were Whites." Id.
327. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS: DSM-IV (4th ed. 1994).
328. Hugh F. Butts, Some Expert Witnesses Are Blatantly Biased, MEDICAL HER-
ALD. Oct. 1993. at 17.
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[c]omprehensive, adequate psychiatric training should include:
courses in ethnicity, culture, and race; opportunities for con-
ducting short- and long-term psychotherapy with ethnically or
racially diverse patients; and opportunities for short- and long-
term psychotherapy supervision with ethnically or racially di-
verse supervisors. Implicit in these training experiences is the
view that cultural factors influence psychopathology, and knowl-
edge of those factors is vital to the ability to offer sensitive, com-
prehensive, psychiatric care.3 29
This is particularly important now, given the demographic trends
that point towards growing cultural diversity within the United
States population.33 °
This paucity of experts and training can lead to serious repercus-
sions. Frequently, victims of discrimination, in an effort to main-
tain some degree of social effectiveness, attempt to deny the
impact of the discrimination.33 1 As a result, some people who
might otherwise benefit from consultation with a mental health
professional will not seek help.332 Those who try to find medical
attention face the prospect of treatment by someone without the
personal experience or training necessary to provide proper diag-
nosis and treatment.333 This fundamental lack of support from the
medical profession can have an impact, not only on the quality of
direct service provided to patients, but also on the ability of legal
professionals to fully understand and present a client's case.
D. The Continued Slow Recognition of Emotional Harm
The final cycle is one in which the under-valuation of emotional
harm by advocates, fact-finders, medical professionals, and some-
times the victims themselves, leads to inappropriately small
awards, diminished client satisfaction, a dearth of counsel who are
prepared to be retained under economic terms that most victims
329. Id.
330. The American Psychiatric Association has recognized this problem. In its
"Policy Statement on Diversity," the APA announced support for "the development
of cultural diversity among its membership and within the field of psychiatry (includ-
ing in undergraduate and graduate medical education, in faculty development, in re-
search, in psychiatric administration, and in clinical practice) in order to prepare
psychiatrists to better serve a diverse U.S. Population." AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N,
supra note 320.
331. ABRAM KARDINER & LIONEL OVESEY, THE MARK OF OPPRESSION: EXPLO-
RATIONS IN THE PERSONALITY OF THE AMERICAN NEGRO 302-03 (1951); see ELLIS
COSE, THE RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED CLASS 32-36 (1993).
332. Davis, supra note 255, at 1565-68; see Heinrich, supra note 35, at 51.
333. Heinrich, supra note 35, at 51-52.
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are in a position to offer, and poorer remedial processes.334 This, in
turn, makes it less likely that substantial awards will occur at a suf-
ficiently frequent rate and contributes, to the ineffectiveness of
anti-housing discrimination laws.
Despite this, there is one reason that clients repeatedly cite as
the motivation for seeking legal redress for housing discrimination.
That motivating factor is emotional harm. Experience shows that
the upset and outrage that is the natural result of being denied a
basic human need, shelter, is the single most potent motivation to
litigate. In case after case, clients speak with passion about the
hurt that they have endured, their need to force those who caused
them pain to take responsibility for breaking the law, and their de-
sire to do what can be done to prevent the repetition of
discrimination. 335
It would be naive to assert that housing discrimination will van-
ish in the face of consistently high damage awards. Conversely, it
would be unrealistic and unduly cynical to suggest that the prospect
of significant compensation would have no effect on the willingness
of victims to pursue relief or that the specter of a large judgment
would not have an impact on some number of potential perpetra-
tors.336 In any event, it is certain that high awards have a direct
impact on the immediate defendants, counsel, and plaintiffs in-
volved in housing discrimination litigation.
Moreover, the power of precedent can be significant in its effect
on subsequent awards. It is difficult to read an opinion in a case
awarding emotional harm damages that does not rely on or cite to
334. There are very few providers of free legal services to victims of housing dis-
crimination. Housing discrimination litigation is typically a very costly endeavor
when done with the assistance of counsel who are paid at an hourly rate. It is rare for
private attorneys to undertake representation of a plaintiff in a housing discrimination
dispute on a contingency fee basis. This reflects, in part, a perception within the pri-
vate bar that housing discrimination cases rarely result in the caliber of recovery that
would economically justify the investment in time and effort that is required to prop-
erly pursue such cases. As shown earlier, mental suffering is frequently the most sig-
nificant item of damage in human rights law cases. See N.Y. City Transit Auth. v.
State Div. of Human Rights, 573 N.E.2d 40, 43 (N.Y. 1991). Therefore, undervalua-
tion can significantly affect the extent to which housing discrimination cases are
litigated.
335. There can be other motivations for litigating cases of this type. For example,
some clients continue to want the housing that they were denied. To the extent that
the desire to recover money or "get rich quick" is the primary motivation, it is un-
likely to sustain the type of effort and time necessary to see litigation of this type
through to completion, much less collection. This is particularly true where the avail-
able public information reflects a paucity of significant financial recoveries.
336. See Kale Williams, Foreword: Maximizing Damages in a Fair Housing Case, 26
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 1 (1992).
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the range of awards previously made by other courts.337 Though
the resort to precedent in arriving at or evaluating suitable awards
can be troubling, there can be little doubt that this practice is, and
will continue to be, commonplace. As a general rule, awards in
other cases should be viewed by the fact finder as instructive, to be
used as a guide, but not binding.338 The Second Circuit, in Martell
v. Boardwalk Enterprises Inc.,3 observed that there are, "difficul-
ties inherent in comparing one personal injury award to another
because of the differentiating facts in each case limit the preceden-
tial value of a court's treatment of awards in other apparently simi-
lar cases.''340 This is yet another reason why it is so important for
the impact of emotional harm to be fully articulated and properly
evaluated in each case.
E. Breaking the Cycle
In the early days of the Columbia Law School Fair Housing
Clinic, we began to experience some of the same barriers that we
would later learn were common to veteran housing discrimination
litigators.34' In our efforts to secure our clients' goals, we spent the
majority of our energies attempting to establish liability. We soon
learned, that it was just as important to spend at least as much time
preparing our case on damages if we were ultimately to secure ade-
quate remedies for clients.
Over time, experience has shown that measures can be taken in
the pursuit a meaningful damage award. These measures should,
in the normal course, lead to a trial record sufficient to support
higher awards. Further, and perhaps even more importantly, we
have found that the provision of competent and caring legal ser-
vices is itself a significant part of the healing process for many cli-
ents. In short, skillful, thorough, sensitive advocacy can constitute
relief. To the extent that an attorney can assist the client in prop-
erly presenting an important and personal grievance, that attorney
can validate the client's experience, promote the societal goals ex-
337. See, e.g., Broome v. Biondi, 17 F. Supp. 2d 211, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); N.Y. City
Transit Auth., 577 N.E.2d at 45-46.
338. Martell v. Boardwalk Enter. Inc., 748 F.2d 740, 750 (2d Cir. 1984); cf. Senko v.
Fonda, 384 N.Y.S.2d 849, 851 (App. Div. 1976) (noting that prior awards "may guide
and enlighten the court[s]").
339. Martell, 748 F.2d at 750.
340. Id.
341. For an interesting discussion of the early efforts to obtain meaningful awards
of emotional harm, see 1 KENTUCKY COMM'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 56, at
23-241.
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pressed in the statutes, and assist the client in bringing some clo-
sure to a painful and psychologically destructive episode.
Presenting full and accurate information on the issue of emo-
tional harm to the court is a first step in breaking the cycles of
ignorance and segregation and making the victims of housing dis-
crimination whole. As a way of concretizing and illustrating the
more theoretical aspects of this Article, providing practical assis-
tance to civil rights advocates and their clients, and applying what
we have learned about emotional injuries, we offer our "Emotional
Harm Checklist."
INTRODUCTION TO USING THE CHECKLIST
Interviewing a client about feelings, particularly with regard to
housing discrimination, can be difficult. Feelings are often hard to
discuss with friends, much less strangers. In addition, many clients
feel the need to deny, to themselves and others, the harm suffered.
It is important to give thought to the process of interviewing on
this topic as well as to the content of such interviews. Much can be
written about how to encourage the discussion of emotional harm.
There are no universal solutions. For now, however, here are a few
basic suggestions. First, explain why you are asking such personal
questions. Illustrate how the inquiry is connected to achieving the
client's stated goals. Second, begin with open-ended questions
such as, "how did you feel at the time of the incident?" You should
make it possible for the client to speak fully and in her own words.
This is important because there is a fine line between conducting a
thorough interview and putting words into the client's mouth.
Open questions are also good conversation starters. Once the con-
versation has begun, you can move to the more narrow questions
suggested in the Checklist. The Checklist may also be useful in the
event that the client is not responding to your open-ended
questions.
Differences in race, age, and gender between attorney and client
can inhibit the exchange of information. Generally, such differ-
ences can be overcome by demonstrating a receptivity and sensitiv-
ity to information of this type. Victims of housing discrimination
frequently experience severe, confusing, and disquieting reactions.
Lawyers can short-circuit full expression by indicating discomfort
or skepticism regarding a client's response to the discriminatory
event. Many clients look for signs (verbal and non-verbal) that it is
okay to talk candidly about such personal, emotionally charged
issues.
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Tell the client how you plan to proceed with the inquiry, explain-
ing that no detail or sentiment is unimportant or unacceptable.
The structure through which facts are gathered can affect the qual-
ity and quantity of the information revealed by the client.
Consider proceeding chronologically. For example, ask the cli-
ent to discuss why she was looking for another place to live or why
she chose the dwelling in question. Then move through the time of
the discriminatory incident, and to feelings and events thereafter.
At each point, ask the client to tell you as much as possible about
she felt.
It is also useful to elicit comparisons between the way the client
felt, reacted, or thought before the incident regarding the topics
listed below, and how she felt at the time of the illegal conduct, one
week later, a month later, or more. Feelings and reactions that oc-
cur in response to discrimination change over time-sometimes for
the better, sometimes for worse. Indeed, finding out from your cli-
ent what it will take to recover fully, often sheds light on the mag-
nitude and lasting impact of the harm suffered.
Once there is a process for interviewing the client, the attorney
will want to conduct a thorough inquiry. The checklist that follows
is derived from cases, statutes, articles, expert testimony, and expe-
rience. It is included to facilitate a full inquiry and ultimately an
adequate recovery. Certainly, no two people experience incidents
of this type in the same way. Nevertheless, there is a remarkable
similarity in the scope and extent of reactions to housing discrimi-
nation. Those similarities are reflected in the checklist that appears
below.
THE EMOTIONAL HARM CHECKLIST
1) Background:
a) Where are you from?
b) Where are you currently living?
i) How long have you lived in this area?
ii) What is your age?
iii) What is your occupation?
c) What are your interests?
d) How often have you taken primary responsibility for
finding housing?
e) Were/are there other members of your household who
were/are depending on you to find housing?
2) Have you ever been involved in a housing discrimination
lawsuit before?
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3) Have you ever been involved in any litigation before?
4) Have you experienced prior incidents of discrimination?
a) If yes, at a later point in the interview, after the client
has fully described her/his reaction to the current dis-
crimination, ask whether the client's reaction to the cur-
rent discrimination is different from reactions to prior
acts of discrimination. If so, to what does the client
attribute the differences in reaction?
5) How would you describe your identity (with which protected
class(es) does the client identify)?
6) Is the client's membership in the protected class(es) with
which she identifies apparent to you upon observation? If
not, ask the client how she believes the discriminator knew
of the client's membership in the protected class(es).
7) The housing search:
a) How long had you been searching for housing before
this incident?
b) Why were you looking for housing?
c) What were you looking for in your new home (more
room, a home in a particular neighborhood, proximity
to schools, work, recreation, relatives/friends)? What
was your price range? What features or amenities did
you hope to find?
d) What symbolic importance, if any, did this new home
hold for you? (Was this the first time you were "on
your own"? Was the move something you had been
saving for? Was it to be a symbol of independence or
financial achievement? Was it the reward for hard work
or "playing by the rules"? Was it your small piece of
the "American dream"?)
8) The "subject premises" (i.e., the dwelling that is the subject
of the present controversy) ("SP"):
a) Fully describe the SP, (if you were not allowed to see
the SP, describe the ad that attracted you to the SP). If
the client became interested in the SP as a result of an
ad, get a copy of the ad and find out how long the ad
ran.
b) What (in detail) attracted you to the SP?
c) What plans, if any, had you made for moving in, reno-
vating, etc., (how emotionally invested were you)?
d) How far along in the acquisition process had you gotten
before being rejected?
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e) What actions, if any, had you taken in reliance, or in the
belief that you would be moving into a new home?
(These can range from telling family and friends that
you were moving, to leaving your prior dwelling or, in
some cases, actually moving into the SP.)
9) The discriminatory event:
a) In complete detail, chronologically describe what hap-
pened (i.e., the sequence of events that constitutes the
violations of law). Let the client determine where the
chronology begins and ends. At each significant event,
stop and ask the client what she was thinking/feeling.
You might consider audio/video taping the interview (if
the client is amenable and if you think it won't curtail
the information flow) as a way of capturing all of the
communication from the client.
b) Did anyone witness any portion of these events?
i) Who (name, address, phone/fax etc.)?
c) What portion of the events did she witness?
d) What aspects, if any, of your reaction to the discrimina-
tory events did she witness?
e) Is the witness willing to be of assistance?
10) Aggravating circumstances:
a) Was abusive language used? (get as near a precise quo-
tation as possible)
b) Was this a "public" humiliation in any sense? Where
did the discriminatory act(s) take place? Were family
members, friends or associates present?
i) If yes, how did their presence affect you?
c) Were there any other outrageous circumstances, such as
mocking, laughter, disdain or other forms of rudeness by
the offending party(ies)?
d) Were you lied to by the discriminator(s)?
i) When/how did you find out?
1. How did you feel when you found out?
11) On how many occasions were you in contact with the perpe-
trator(s)?
a) Describe what was said or done on each occasion.
b) What was your immediate psychological reaction to the
discriminatory treatment?
12) Did you experience any of the following common symp-
toms? (provide details/examples under each applicable cate-
gory):
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a) emotional numbing, feeling stunned;
b) withdrawal (usually to the home, bed, and away from
those in the home; often the client requests that she be
left alone.);
c) helplessness;
d) anger (if yes, how intense?);
e) feelings of inadequacy;
f) anxiety;
g) panic attacks;
h) constant reliving of the incident (interference with con-
centration);
i) confusion;
j) loss of control over matters that affect you;
k) feeling unwanted, unworthy, unappealing;
1) humiliation;
m) sleep disturbance;
n) embarrassment;
o) depression;
p) lethargy, inability or unwillingness to care for self or
others, not wanting to get out of bed or leave the home;
q) staying home from work or school? (If yes, give exact
dates.) For days missed at work, was there a loss of
pay? What excuse was given to the employer? Any
negative ramifications on the job or at school for missed
days? Get copies of time/attendance records or pay
stubs for corroboration;
r) inability to face day-to-day responsibilities;
s) diminished self-esteem;
t) negative changes in appearance ("letting yourself go");
u) irritability, lack of patience;
v) feelings of shock or disbelief;
w) tension;
x) mood swings;
y) morbid sadness;
z) mirthless smiling, sighing;
aa) inability to make decisions;
bb) engaging in self-destructive acts (overeating, increased/
renewed smoking, drinking, involvement with drugs,
inappropriate use of medications);
cc) increased dependency on others;
dd) lack of humor;
ee) blaming oneself for what happened;
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ff) feeling generally discouraged;
gg) Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (see the American Psy-
chiatric Association's "Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders," commonly called the "DSM IV").
13) Compare the client's feelings and behavior before the inci-
dent with the feelings and behavior described in section 5
above.
14) In what ways have the client's reactions to the incident
changed over time, for better or worse?
15) Have you experienced any physical reactions to the discrimi-
natory treatment? Provide complete details under each cate-
gory. (The physical symptoms may be new to the client or
an exacerbation of past ailments. For example, the client
may either experience a stomach ulcer for the first time or
an aggravation of an existing ulcer.)
16) Have you experienced any of the following physical symp-
toms?:
a) hypertension;
b) ulcers or upset stomach/indigestion;
c) headaches (including migraines);
d) asthma;
e) arthritis;
f) loss of sleep/insomnia;
g) easily startled (hyper-arousal);
h) crying (if yes, describe the occasions upon which you
cried before the incident and compare with the fre-
quency and extent of crying after the incident);
i) loss of appetite;
j) diminished interest in physical pleasures (sex, exercise,
eating);
k) neck/back pain.
17) In the case of both psychological and physical reactions, was
a doctor or other health care provider consulted? Whom did
you consult? For what length of time? Cost? Was medica-
tion prescribed or increased?
18) Were your interactions with friends or family affected? If so,
how? (This is a very common and often destructive result of
discrimination. Pay particular attention to this inquiry.
Methodically probe into each affected relationship. Consider
calling the affected person as a witness to corroborate
changes in your client's behavior.)
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19) Describe whether and/or how you told your wife, husband,
partner, children, or friends about the incident.
20) If you have not told people you would ordinarily confide in
about the incident, why not?
21) Has the incident affected you on the job?
22) Has your job performance been adversely affected? In what
ways? Give details.
23) Have there been any job performance evaluations since the
incident? Any changes from pre-incident evaluations?
24) Has the incident affected your relationship with peers or
superiors on the job? How so?
25) Has the incident changed the way you interact with or view
people of the same class (race, gender, national origin, etc.)
as the discriminator(s)?
26) Has the incident changed your outlook?:
a) on life;
b) on your beliefs (Do you find yourself thinking, "I
worked hard, played by the rules and still was not
treated fairly"?);
c) regarding the faith you had placed in those you had
relied on ("my parents never prepared me for this");
d) regarding current events (becoming more conscious of
racism and other forms of discriminatory behavior);
e) regarding your prospects for the future.
27) How often do you think about the incident? Has that
changed over time?
28) Have there been other stress-producing events in your life
that would account for the above-listed changes? What are
they? When did they occur? How did you react to them?
How was/is your reaction to the other stressors different
from your reaction to the discriminatory treatment? Could
these, or other stressors be the cause of any of the changes
listed above? If not, why not?
29) Who can corroborate any of the psychological and/or physi-
cal changes listed above? It is often very helpful (though
not legally necessary) to have family members, friends, work
associates, and health care professionals corroborate the
changes you experienced.
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30) Have you continued the search for housing? Have you mod-
ified the search in any way (restricted the search to neigh-
borhoods where you are not likely to encounter future
discrimination, felt it necessary to "announce" your member-
ship in the protected class over the phone or in person,
etc.)?
31) What will it take for you to feel fully recovered? Do you
think that therapy is required? If so, how long do you think
the therapy will need to continue? Would validation or vin-
dication at trial aid the healing process?
32) How long will it take you to recover fully?
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